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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ALTA INDUSTRIES LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, dba 
Steelco, and ALTA INDUSTRIES-
UTAH, INC., a Utah 
corporation, in its capacity 
as general partner of Alta 
Industries Ltd., 
Plaintiffs/Appel 1 ees, 
-v-
L, m N P. HURST WASATCH 
STEEL, INC., 
corporation,, 
Defendants/Appellants 
_ _ _ _ _ „ _
 l 
J U R I f l D I C T I 0 N 
I I in mi I o u r t • s i i i r i s d i c t i o n i s b a s e d m i A r t i c l e V I I I , % I , 
i i in s ! in I ml in i ill in 111 I I  in I ill i 111 I (( Illi mil in In n i l <> i in in mi in i I i i I I ) 
(1987 arid Supp. Il I ) ; and Rules i rind 4 of t h e Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 
S T A T E M E N T Q F T H E I S S p E S ^ ^ S T A N D A R D Q F R Ey I E W 
defendants present for review the followi ng errors: 
1 . ,• Il i I a J in1 ; in: i ::! ::i sun i ssed fc ecai 3 se tl l = 3 ha i 
b e e n I  I ,/ t, lie plaintiff ' s settlement Agreement .h I ts 
former whieh p1aintiff released claims acts 
upoi i their , . urns ai e based. 
." The plaintiff's claims for conversion and for fraud and 
HI r ' ] 11 n t i ' 'i1 11 ii HI 1 ill Illi Il i i iiii i j s i n :i s s e d i in i I  in i J i ' ecause 
they were barred by lite statute of limitations. 
j # "!"}ie findings ol lxaud and conspiracy are not supported by 
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A-. The finding of conversion is not supported by the 
evidence, 
5. The damages awarded were improper and excessive because: 
a. The damages were improperly calculated on the basis 
of retail value, 
b. The calculation of the damage amount did not 
distinguish between steel that was acquired by plaintiff's employee 
by purchase or by gift from the plaintiff and steel for which the 
employee had not paid the plaintiff. 
c. The calculation of the damage amount did not 
distinguish between the type and value of the steel sold to the 
defendants. 
d. There is no basis for the award of punitive damages. 
e. There is no basis for the award of attorneys' fees. 
Issues three and four raise questions of fact with respect to 
which the standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" rule under 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Copper State Leasing Co. 
v. Black Appliance & Furniture, 770 P.2d 88, 93 (Utah 1988). 
The remaining issues present primarily questions of law but to 
some extent involve mixed questions of law and fact. Conclusions 
of law will be reviewed for correctness with no "particular 
deference to the trial court's" view. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 
1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 
1 v. Jackson Cattle Co. , 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). Findings 
will be overturned under the clearly erroneous rule if they are 
either without adequate evidentiary foundation or are induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. Western Carntal & Sens. . Tnn. v. 
(Utah 1989 WngL * U l e r , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and 
l . j jceau,». " .; . *c*" u* ttooie ajiu. J . u u c a s , 
M o o r e ' s F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e , \ i ^ . O i j i ,
 t 199 * 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Jhe I 111 I ow iiiij s t a t t i l e b r e l e v a n t I I In: iipp^a! itii M Icir t l i 
in Appendix A: "i .in code? Ann. , %% ' 8 - 1 2 - 2 M i I'iKV) 
f s t a t u t e ill I l nnf. i t l fin i | muni lltnh Code Ann, Vi 1 5 - 4 - 1 , 3 and 4 
(1986) I n ; l e a s e of | o i n t o b l i g a t i o n s ] . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of t h e c a s e 
and t h e p r o c e e d i n g s 
i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
Tin* 111 ii i ill in I I U fiimi 11 " .i" I fir i nijpr'j f in i in W<ir>ntch ^ t e e l 
f "Wasa tch" ) and I t s g e n e r a l manage! Lynn a u u ^ p c i s o n a A ^ . I.lie 
s a l e of b a s i c a l l y s c r a p s f p o l whin hi ^ s J *>as*fch tine 
S i per i iiLeiidciil < "M I ' I ', 1 i'i« It i» i« I " f « s 
ipi'r mteacliMiit was g i v e n some s t e e l and t - u t t e d t< max- some 
f nirchaFuvi I" scTrip rebu i l t inn) f'i DIII f ' s 
I MI i . i c e s s i n g p l a n l " "( Ii 11 'III In u r e s o l d t o deLendan t - s . i , ;e i t- no 
"I I ion t h a t h e p a i d h i s employer foi t h e i n i t i o -\* - ^ . i which 
I 11 I ' 1 « ! . » ! I II I II I "III II I I I  I i ill I I I | ! U t S L » ! I " t 
"« - directed to dispose ul II. ; r.ems or taon.ate: steel 
left in an outside storage - - was 
l
"Steelco," according to the cap t. ion in this case, is a name 
under which Alta Industries Ltd., a limited partnership, does 
•iiness " H ta Industries Ltd.'s general partner, Alta Industries 
" a nominal party. 
authorized to sell some of this more-or-less junk steel for his own 
account. The case centers on the fact that the Superintendent 
continued to sell (but did not pay his employer for) what 
ultimately aggregated to a fairly substantial amount of the scrap 
cuttings over the course of a four-year period, not only to the 
defendants here, but to several other companies also, and that he 
also kept part of the proceeds from the sale of the larger junk 
fabricated items. Steelco claims that the defendant Lynn Hurst 
personally and the company for which he worked and was a part 
owner, the defendant Wasatch Steel, knew that the Superintendent 
had stolen this surplus steel and conspired with him. Defendants 
deny knowledge of the Superintendent's wrongdoing and assumed that 
he had authority to dispose of the surplus pieces. 
The complaint was filed April 11, 1989. Trial started 
September 25, 1990. The case was tried to the court without a 
jury, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding. Plaintiff based 
its case on four theories: conversion; fraud and conspiracy; 
violation of the Utah racketeering statute; and receiving stolen 
property. A memorandum decision was issued on October 21, 1990. 
Thereafter the court adopted verbatim and without change findings 
of fact and conclusions of law submitted by plaintiff. The court 
rejected plaintiff's theories of racketeering and receiving stolen 
property, found defendants liable on the conversion and fraud and 
conspiracy counts, rejected defendants' release and statute of 
limitations defenses, and awarded general damages of $120,417.15 
(based on a conversion theory of damages), $100,000 in punitive 
damages , and $ 3 5 , 8 5 0 i n a t t o r n e y s • f e e s , f o r a t o t a 3 of 
$256
 # 2 6 7 . 1 5 , p i u s i n t e r e s t and c o s t ! =; 
e v i d e n c e and t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of an e r r o n e o u s m e a s u r e of damages and 
winch shorn lull llrivc hi 'en r e j e c t e d t o beg :i n wi t h b e c a u s e i t i s b a s e d 
on in c i a i m s b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of 1 i i i i i ta t i o n s and by a w r i t t e n 
r e l e a s e g i v e n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s S u p e r i n t e n d e n t . 
S t a t e m e n t o1 F a c t s 
P l a i n t i f f S t e e l c o and d e f e n d a n t Wasa tch S t e e l , w h i l e b o t h a r e 
d e s c i i bed i " s t e e l rompan i rr., " at n in d i f f e r e n t t y p o s of b u s i n e s s . 
They a r e n o t c o m p e t i t o r s , S t e e l c o h a n d l e s b iy s a l e s tn major 
c u s t o m e r s . i-witch - i e a l s b a s i c a l I , " houqh m l e x c l u s i v e l y , in 
a in a I I saJe* I 11 iniiill in I'liiilli l e e IU 11 i l lc i ls |n iniai i l , iiiiiii llattje 
e i d e r s of new s t e e l ; Wasa tch d e a l s p r i m a r i l y , thnuqh ant s o l e l y , in 
s ilia I I i a I I i1 iir nl Inn! In ur.nd IIMJI IIIIIII a s t e e l q e n c r a l l , , bill no t 
s o l e l y , oj Llie t ype which i i t e e l e o c l jooses n o t Lu d e a l la and would 
t i c d t a s s c r a p \h 4 lai al ,' H, l lali-l ' i l ) 
olve I i ijluf.1 in Il a IJ I I I in I I I I ,1 all I i I iltat I a pi lauaj i I , i a 
l n q i e s t o c k s h e e t s and bai •.«ncJ t ingle s t e e l I I liuys i n l a r g e , 
t r u c k - l o a d q u a n t i t if, •• frrmi imiai |cj .1 i all nil I III1. I In q u a n t i t i e s of 
s h e e t and ba r and a n g l e a r e s t o r e d and t h e n eat . anui l u b r i c a t e d i n 
i t s p l a n t t o meet c u s t o m e r r e q u i r e m e n t s , i ) l e n " a in I "I i "" of 
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fabricates stock sizes to a customer's order, pieces aie lei I over, 
l'cin after ton" of these leftover pieces, or "cuttings,M are 
developed each month. (R. 450 at 157.) Anything left over from 
the large stock size of sheet or plate steel less than six inches 
in width, regardless of its length, is considered by Steelco to be 
"scrap" and is thrown into a "scrap tub." When dealing with beams, 
angles, or channels, anything less than five feet in length is 
considered scrap and goes into the scrap tub.2 Anything larger is 
put back in inventory, "hopefully" to be used on some other 
project. Steelco calls this "remnant." (R. 450 at 119, 153-154.) 
Scrap is sold for "a minimum amount of money" to a scrap dealer. 
Between 1983 and 1987 the scrap price was generally 10 or 20 a 
pound. Occasionally it got a little higher, maybe up to 30 a 
pound. (R. 451 at 87.) "Very rarely" did Steelco sell remnant, 
but it was "hopefully" used in filling customers1 orders where 
larger sizes salvaged from a prior project could be used. (R. 451 
at 119-120.) Defendants, on the other hand, do not consider these 
terms to be so precisely defined in the industry, and "scraps, 
remnants, drops, shearings, leftovers [all] imply mostly the same 
definition." (R. 450 at 40.) This is important because Steelco 
may contend that reference to "remnant" in questions put by 
plaintiff's counsel are according to his definition, but it must be 
remembered that Mr. Hurst answered according to his own definition. 
Steelco generally purchased stock sizes of steel for 160 to 
180 per pound and sold it at a 25% markup in the "low 20" cents 
per pound range. (R. 450 at 120.) Remnant, when it could be used 
2However, even this definition is inexact because Plaintiff 
explained that it would not be economical for Steelco to try and 
use even a 10-foot piece of angle iron. (R. 450 at 155-156.) 
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Heaton, j: ] aint if f l s Superintendent H«i : \ w af • ; plaintiff f s chief 
w'j tness at tri a] He was General Superintei ident ov er c 11 of 
Steeico • s production faci ] i ties T i ise the descripti on of 
plaintiff's counse] , he "was in charge of overseeing the activities 
of the steel storage, steel fabrication and steel sales out in the 
working part of the business." (R. 450 at 6.) He was responsible 
for the "overall operation of the plant," including all of the 
steel inventory both inside and outside the plant, all of the 
processing and fabricating operations, and the loading and 
transportation department. (R. 450 at 195.) He was in charge of 
the pieces of steel left over in these processes. (R. 451 at 66.) 
Steelco is a large operation, and Volma Heaton was an 
important man in the organization. Plaintiff's plant operated on 
at least two full shifts a day. (R. 451 at 102.) There were only 
two or three people above Heaton in this entire company. The only 
two higher executives are Leon Hansen, the general manager of the 
steel division during the entire pertinent time period (1983-1987) , 
and Robert Elkington, a certified public accountant formerly with 
Touche, Ross & Co., who is president of the entire company. (R. 
450 at 116, R. 452 at 119-121.) During the early part of this time 
period, Darrell Milzarek was plant manager, but he left in 1984 or 
1985. (R. 451 at 66-67.) He was "the plant manager with Volma" 
Heaton. (R. 450 at 152.) Plaintiff called Mr. Hansen and Mr. 
Elkington to testify at the trial but did not call Mr. Milzarek. 
Volma Heaton, as the Superintendent, was in charge of the 
processing plant and reported directly to Hansen. While Mr. 
Milzarek was there, Heaton also reported to him. (Id.) 
Although Mr. Hansen, the general manager of the steel 
division, has his office with the company's general offices almost 
a block away from the processing plant, he is at the processing 
plant "continually, four, five, six, seven times a day." (R. 450 
a I 148-149.) -This I s tho p l a n t where Vol ma Heat on, as t h e 
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customer's to Wasatch, (h <• >H nl I'M
 ( There were transactions 
between the two companies, and steelco purchased steel on occasioi i 
from Wasatch. (R. 451 at 151.) Even before the matters here 
involved, each company had an account with the other. (R. 451 at 
19«) 
It was not surprising, therefore, when the plaintiff's 
Superintendent came to Wasatch in 1983 and inquired if Wasatch was 
interested in buying scrap steel. (He knew as a matter of common 
knowledge in the industry that Wasatch bought and sold these small 
pieces of new steel.) He was told that would depend on the type of 
material—to bring it over so Mr. Hurst could see it. (R. 451 at 
74-75; R. 454 at 72.) He took some over in his pickup truck. (R. 
451 at 84.) He told Hurst that he was authorized to buy this scrap 
steel from Steelco and resell it. (R. 451 at 75-76, 79-81; R. 454 
at 72.) Heaton also sold steel to Allstar Manufacturing, implying 
that he owned the steel he was selling. (R. 451 at 33.) 
At the time Heaton started this process of buying from his 
employer and reselling, his purchases were in fact authorized by 
Milzarek. (R. 451 at 91.) Mr. Hansen also had authorized a number 
of these purchases by his Superintendent. (R. 450 at 182-183.) 
This even included quantities beyond the amount where he started 
"worrying about [employees] reselling" rather than just buying for 
their own use. (R. 450 at 181.) Some purchases by Heaton could be 
identified from plaintiff's records, but certainly not all of them. 
These particular purchases by Heaton which could be identified and 
which were authorized by Hansen, including those of more than just 
nominal value which would cause concern about reselling, occurred 
as late as 1986, as shown by dates on invoices that plaintiff did 
still have. (Ex. 16-P; R. 450 at 178-184.) 
Mr, I) in.son c o n c e d e s tha t ; he n e v e r q u e s t i o n e d Heator i and Hea ton 
, mi lid ml "•'I I most" wliii I Iiii!'" wanted , , u J! I:I t h e m a t e r i a l . " 
(R, 4bt) at I H4 , ) llciitoii b e l i e v e d Lie had I'.ieen a u t h o r i z e d t o buy 
some of t h i s s t e e l and r e s e l l i t . (I' 4!>1 a t 7 5 , 8 5 - 8 6 , y . l . ) I ill i.m 
he s t a r t e d s e l l inij t h e s e siualJ load;,-,, t I ^ .u^-itch lio |,., m l loi I In "iiii • 
(R 451 a t 7 2 - 7 3 , 86 , 9 4 . ) The re were c a s h p a y m e n t s made by Mr. 
Heafcor h i I Ill „ Mi l za rok i I > I'nt'ty Miidqli y
 ( t h e p e r s o n i n c h a r g e of 
s a l e s in t h e p l a n t o f f i c e , fo r which t h e r e Is no a c c o u n t in 
p l a i n t i f f ' s own, iTH/ords (IV <!, SCI tit 180-1R1; R, 451 a t "100; K 452 
at 101.) On some o c c a s i o n s Hoalon was in I n v\i y \ \ \ e n a i c c e 11 1 I i 
h i s m o n e y . ( R . 4 5 1 a t 9 1 - 9 3 . ) T h e r e i s n o r e c o r d o f w h a t h a p p e n e d 
I I In •, I mi mi | 11 in vi" i in I I I in l l i l ' a r f l in II If I in rli 11 p) • E I'll! dill I it h e 
stopped pa\ in in \ Hon I i in .it first nevertheless intended to pay at 
some time. He did not communicate tn defendants or anyone else his 
secret change in intnnMon (I1 1UI \\\ si | Ii.vcn I dim in llHh 
and 1 937, lie paid for some purchases ao shown by plaintiff • s f twin 
MM 'OnJj Il III 'III " I III II I k O i " I I ( I ( I ( h - II h 'II I 
Tn fin is" period, Steelco moved its operation ^ ~ -~* "•—>firr 
formerly owned hy another Ftp"1 comp^1 , ( >t • -*"Med the ~vith 
i i e i r d , .nil JLiii jL p i e c o ill n | n n | i i o j i # j i l y , M M I I 
c v u i r y c o n c e i v a b l e k i n d o l >.t i i I ill l n o a t 1 2 - 1 3 3 , * 152 
ill I ' I I  ' I 1 1 mi in I 1 III in i II mi mi II I i mi in IIII 
obtained h\ the previous owner from steel mil J- ^ua, *wi . :. 
result of overbuy! nq on various project1 (bill f"h^ n*7h once n*j *" -
was now nun Led JI: n II>, nil ml il*. .JIUMHIC uutbii . 
it was various fabricated pieces and items of equipment that were 
discarded by the prior owner. (R. 451 at 10-11, 109-110.) 
Eventually Steelco management desired to have the South Yard 
cleaned up and the useable material processed. At that time, Volma 
Heaton, the Superintendent, had a conversation with his supervisor, 
Mr. Hansen, the steel division manager, in which Heaton was 
authorized to remove some of this material in the South Yard for 
himself without paying for it. This was scrap material such as 
beams that had welds on them or angles and different items that 
Heaton had to cut apart to move out of there. He cut up and 
removed a large quantity of this and sold it to Wasatch Metals. 
(Wasatch Metals is a company entirely separate from Wasatch Steel, 
owned and operated by different people, but located next door to 
Wasatch Steel. (R. 450 at 60; R. 451 at 14.) However, some of the 
beams were stacked up in the cleanup process. These beams were not 
in condition to be sold as new material because they had welds on 
them or holes punched in them, and Hansen directed Heaton to 
dispose of them. He contacted Lynn Hurst at Wasatch Steel and 
arranged for the sale of all of this to Wasatch. (R. 451 at 16-
18.) 
After Heaton had contacted Mr. Hurst, Hurst came over to 
Steelco to look at the material and gave a bid on a large quantity. 
(R. 450 at 67.) Mr. Hansen told Heaton to "go ahead and sell 
them." (R. 451 at 17.) Although Heaton understood he was to sell 
this on behalf of Steelco, he told Hurst that he owned part of the 
steel and he directed Hurst to pay Heaton personally for some of 
it. (R. 450 at 67; R. 451 at 17-20, 114.) Mr. Hurst followed the 
directions of Steelcofs Superintendent and did make some payments 
to Steelco and some to Mr. Heaton as directed by the 
Superintendent. 
Mr. Hansen estimated that there were 40 tons of this equipment 
and unusable items in the South Yard and ,f10, 15 times as much" 
more usable material. (R. 451 at 11.) On several occasions Wasatch 
sent its truck over to get material sold to it. On other occasions 
Steelco trucks delivered it to Wasatch. Obviously, there were 
many, many loads. They were not paid for at time of delivery, but 
after groups of say "three, four, five loads" plaintiff's 
Superintendent, Heaton, would direct Mr. Hurst which loads were to 
be paid to Steelco and which loads were to be paid to him. (R. 451 
at 114-115.) Heaton claims that he told Hurst on several occasions 
that Steelco must not know about these payments. (R. 451 at 7-8.) 
Cleanup of the South Yard took place in 1986 and was completed in 
December 1986. (R. 452 at 121-122.) 
New scrap steel sold between 1983 and 1987 to Wasatch was 
usually handled in a pickup truck. Sometimes it was Heaton1s 
personal pickup. Other times delivery was made to Wasatch in a 
Steelco truck. (R. 451 at 114.) Midway in this period Heaton had 
a company pickup so the delivery was made in his Steelco pickup. 
(R. 451 at 2.) On occasion Heaton would have Mr. Hurst come over 
to Steelco and look at cuttings which he told Hurst were going to 
scrap to see if Wasatch was interested in buying them. (R. 450 at 
67.) Mr. Hurst was at plaintiff's plant to look at steel that 
Heaton proposed to sell him about ten or fifteen different times. 
On one occasion he examined material even inside the plant. On 
that occasion the bid he gave was not accepted and presumably 
Heaton disposed of the material elsewhere. (R. 454 at 98-99.) 
The first shift at Steelco ended and a second shift started in 
the processing and loading departments at 3:30 p.m.. (R. 451 at 
101-102.) So, from 6:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. there were a sizable 
work force and supervisors at the plant. Heaton usually loaded the 
materials himself, but occasionally an employee helped him. (R. 
451 at 101.) Often he used cranes or other equipment to load it. 
Mr. Milzarek saw him loading steel on some occasions, but he never 
questioned Heaton because Heaton told him he was buying it. (R. 
451 at 103.) Particularly "at the beginning" (1983 and 1984), 
Heaton is certain that Milzarek saw him loading steel. (R. 451 at 
102-107.) The loading was usually done after Heatonfs regular 
shift ended at 3:30 p.m. (or on a Saturday) , but he had to have the 
material over to Wasatch before 5:00 p.m. because Wasatch closed at 
that time. (R. 451 at 104.) Sometimes Heaton filled out a 
"ticket" for the loads; other times he did not. Tickets were 
filled out by him at least in 1984 and 1986 as shown by the tickets 
in evidence. (R. 451 at 107.) 
During this period the Superintendent, Heaton, was also 
selling Steelco material to at least three other companies as well 
—Davis Supply, Mr. Trailer, and Allstar Manufacturing. (R. 451 at 
32-37; R. 452 at 147, 207; R. 453 at 4-5.) Heaton was even selling 
fabricated material to these companies. In the case of Allstar 
this involved fabrication of parts for stoves. (R. 451 at 32-34.) 
In other words, Heaton was also using Steelcofs facility to 
manufacture items that he sold to others. 
A precise record was kept by Wasatch on every purchase and 
payment made. Most payments were by check. Check records and 
receipts have been kept. A receipt was given on both cash payments 
and checks to Heaton. (R. 450 at 42-49.) 
One of Steelco*s customers, Equitech, manufactures tractors 
used at airports for pulling large jet aircraft from passenger 
loading terminals. Heavy steel plate is placed in these tractors 
as "ballast" to add additional weight, thereby increasing traction. 
Equitech had been a large customer for several years, and Steelco 
was forming a lot of the tractor chassis and making different parts 
as well as supplying the steel plate used for added weight. (R. 
450 at 139-140.) It takes 20 tons of this steel plate used for 
ballast in each tractor. It is covered up in the tractor and is 
not seen from the outside. For this use Steelco regularly 
purchased from various mills a low grade of plate called "cobble 
steel." This was, in effect, defective steel produced with a 
"cobbled" appearance on its surface. (R. 452 at 47, 106, 115; R. 
454 at 106.) 
In 1986 Steelco needed additional steel plate for this 
ballast. As plaintifffs chief witness in this case, Heaton, 
explained, Steelco needed more of this "heavy plate . . . that 
could be burned in smaller pieces" for this customer. (R. 451 at 
22.) He contacted Lynn Hurst at Wasatch, told him Steelco needed 
this plate, and asked for a price. Mr. Hansen, Heaton1 s boss, also 
explained that Heaton advised the purchasing department that he had 
located some material for use as ballast and requested a purchase 
order. (R. 450 at 138, 186.) When asked for a price, Hurst gave 
a price, but Heaton asked that he be paid a commission for 
generating this business for Wasatch. (R. 451 at 22.) Hurst's 
opinion of Heaton "dropped" when asked for this commission and he 
felt this was "sleazy." (R. 450 at 81, 89.) He did pay the 
commission, however. (R. 450 at 77.) The commissions were paid by 
check and were fully recorded in Wasatchfs records. (R. 450 at 77, 
90-91.) There was no effort to conceal them. Four commission 
checks were paid on March 8, March 27 and May 12, 1986, and August 
8, 1987. (Exs. 13-P and 28-P.) They amounted to a total of 
$2,363.44. There were other transactions with Heaton not so 
clearly identified in Wastach's records, and plaintiff contends 
they were also commissions. They total $1,728.76. Plaintiff 
referred to these throughout the trial as "kickbacks." Even at a 
price set by Wasatch at a level to cover the "commission" demanded 
by Steelco's Superintendent, the price paid by Steelco, 
particularly after considering that this was a delivered price and 
other sources required payment of additional freight from the mill, 
was lower than the price charged by the mills for cobble steel. 
(R. 452 at 65-66.) 
Four or five tractors a month were put out. Cobble steel 
purchased from the mills exceeded in total tons by a "tremendous" 
amount the small quantity sold by Wasatch. (R. 450 at 189-190.) 
A number of people at Steelco, including notably Mr. Hansen, the 
general manager of the steel division, knew of the purchase of this 
ballast steel from Wasatch. (R. 450 at 142.) Some Steelco 
employees even expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the 
stuff, even though it was used solely as ballast inside the tractor 
where it could not be seen. (R. 452 at 115.) 
Another former employee of Steelco, Ms. Chris Williams, 
surfaced in the course of this case and claimed to have been paid 
$6,000 in "commissions" or "kickbacks" by Wasatch. She was a dope 
addict who was taking cocaine every thirty minutes during the 
course of her employment at Steelco. (R. 451 at 145, 162-163.) 
She also was taking other "mind altering" drugs. (R. 451 at 163.) 
She worked in the plaintiff's administrative offices where Mr. 
Hansen and the company president, Elkington, had their offices. 
(See, R. 450 at 147-149.) Hansen was unaware of this drug use. 
(R. 453 at 35.) Elkington did not find out about her drug use 
until after she was fired for stealing cash. (R. 453 at 35.) 
In 1987 a cash shortage was discovered and the company 
required lie detector tests of suspected employees. (R. 452 at 
123.) Ms. Williams lied on her first test and still passed it. 
(R. 453 at 32.) She failed subsequent tests, however, and then 
admitted stealing about $1,000. She was then fired. (R. 452 at 
122-123.) Another of plaintiff's witnesses, Patty Midgley, the 
employee in the plant office at Steelco who prepared orders, 
invoices, and took cash payments, knew of Ms. Williams' addiction 
but said nothing until after the series of lie detector tests. (R. 
451 at 166.) Ms. Williams said there were at least five other 
employees (who are named by her) employed at Steelco who knew she 
was using illegal drugs. (R. 451 at 166-168.) 
Nevertheless, Ms. Williams was called by plaintiff to testify. 
She claimed to have been paid $6,000 in cash payments on purchases 
of this ballast steel which she claimed she arranged herself with 
Lynn Hurst after Volma Heaton told her about the commissions he was 
getting. She had no supporting evidence. She produced no deposit 
slips or other written record. There is no check or any other 
evidence of such payments in Wasatchfs records. She claimed she 
could remember the total of $6,000 because she kept a record in her 
journal, but she destroyed the journal two days before trial. (R. 
451 at 160-161.) She claims to have been paid $6,000 in commis-
sions on purchases by Steelco of $13,586.45 worth of steel. (Ex. 
25-P; R. 151 at 191.) If so, more than half the sales price was 
commissions, for Heaton testified that he asked for and received 
commissions on the very same invoices. (See, Appendix C.) The 
commissions paid to Heaton were calculated in precise cents per 
pound and totaled about twenty-five percent of the price paid by 
Steelco. 
Defendants candidly admitted paying commissions to Heaton. 
Wasatch kept a record of those payments and although displeased at 
being forced to pay a "commission,M it did not hide it. They do 
deny, however, paying any money to Williams, and there is 
absolutely no evidence in Wasatch's records or any place else of 
any payment to her. 
Chris Williams and the Superintendent, Volma Heaton, had a 
"close relationship." She saw him every day at work, they went to 
lunch once or twice a week, went to dinner sometimes, and went to 
bars together. (R. 451 at 167-168.) Williams worked in the 
office, while Heaton was "down in the shop." She sent the orders 
she had typed "down to him," and that is how she got to know him. 
She helped Heaton on eight or twelve occasions on Saturday mornings 
remove steel from the South Yard. Heaton told her "that he had 
made an agreement" with Hansen, the general manager, to remove the 
steel from the yard, "that he was going to pay them a cent and a 
half for that," and that she could make some money if she helped 
him on weekends. Sometimes she drove the company forklift to load 
the steel into Heaton1s pickup; other times she drove around the 
yard and helped "get the good stuff." (R. 451 at 147-150.) 
Lynn Hurst denies ever knowing this lady, let alone paying her 
any commission. (R. 450 at 108.) He did not have cash of this 
sort personally to pay her, and Wasatch did not have that kind of 
cash lying around. All deposits made by Wasatch at its bank show 
that there was no "cash back" given on any deposit, and it was 
against bank policy to permit cash to be given back from a deposit 
made by a business entity. (R. 454 at 46.) 
Heaton and Williams claim, however, that Williams occasionally 
accompanied Heaton to Wasatch where they claim she was introduced 
to Lynn Hurst. To support its claim that Mr. Hurst knew Chris 
Williams, plaintiff included as part of Patty Midgley's testimony 
the claim that she and Chris Williams saw Hurst at a theater and 
that he said hello "generally" to the two of them (R. 452 at 29); 
but on prodding of plaintiff's counsel and over objection of 
defense counsel, she said this greeting was directed more to 
Williams than to her. (R. 452 at 29-30.) This is the same Patty 
Midgley who worked in the office at the plant and received some of 
Heaton's cash payments. (See, R. 452 at 23.) She had also been 
Williams' roommate. (R. 452 at 24.) She, of course, knew Lynn 
Hurst because he was at Steelco on several occasions. (R. 452 at 
25-26.) 
Mr. Hansen and Mr. Elkington claim that they first learned of 
wrongdoing in their company in November 1987, when thefts from cash 
receipts in the shop came to Elkington1s attention. After lie 
detector tests were administered, employees started reporting on 
Volma Heatonfs activities. In November 1987, an employee told 
Elkington that "she had heard" that Heaton was involved in "corrupt 
practices going on in the shop." She revealed Patty Midgley as her 
source. Midgley had not advised her employer of these "corrupt 
practices" or of drug use on the job by company employees. But 
when confronted by the president, she reported that she thought 
Heaton was stealing steel and not paying for it, though she denied 
ever seeing him do that. (R. 452 at 125.) Elkington then had 
Hansen interview all employees who worked directly with Heaton. 
Following these interviews, on a Saturday morning, December 5, 
1987, Elkington received a call in his office (he was working 
Saturday) from an employee in the shop on that Saturday who 
reported seeing Volma Heaton, his Superintendent, take a load of 
steel out of the yard without paying for it. The employee thought 
Heaton was headed for Allstar because he took steel plate that had 
been sheared for stove parts. (Allstar makes stoves and buys cut 
or fabricated steel plate from Steelco. R. 452 at 126.) Elkington 
went to Allstar but he did not see Heaton there. Allstar later 
confirmed that thousands of dollars worth of stove parts had been 
purchased from Heaton and payment had been made directly to him and 
not Steelco. By interrogation of Heaton, it was learned that scrap 
plate had been sold to other companies, including Wasatch. (R. 452 
at 129.) Elkington at that time only "suspended" his 
Superintendent. (Id.) 
One day Heaton came into the office of Wasatch Steel and in 
the course of casual conversation with Lynn Hurst mentioned that 
Hurst might be contacted by someone from Alta Industries wanting 
information about Heaton's transactions with Wasatch. When asked 
why, Heaton said he was being investigated because he had quit 
paying for some of the material he had sold to Wasatch. He also 
asked Hurst, if he was contacted, to withhold the information on 
those transactions. Mr. Hurst told Heaton he did not want to be 
involved in any attempt to withhold information. (R. 454 at 89.) 
Hurst contacted his company's legal counsel, who advised that it 
would be wise to get Heaton1s permission before supplying records 
of Heaton1s transactions. (R. 454 at 91.) 
On December 26, 1987, Elkington called Hurst and explained 
that he was investigating transactions of his Superintendent, 
Heaton, and wanted to look at records of Heaton1s sales to Wasatch. 
As instructed by his lawyer, Hurst explained that if Heaton would 
supply a letter authorizing the release of information, he would be 
happy to supply it. (R. 454 at 89-91, R. 452 at 130.) 
Sometime in this time frame Volma Heaton was formally fired. 
He then gave to Elkington an undated letter (Ex. 20-P) in which he 
recited that he had spent an afternoon at Wasatch going over all 
the receipts and that Wasatch had paid him $9,185.85. He stated 
that he knew that he had "paid Steelco for some of this, but he had 
no records to show how much" and asked in that letter that that 
amount ffbe added to" the amounts Elkington had already calculated. 
He said in his note that Elkington should call Lynn Hurst if he 
wished to verify this amount. (R. 452 at 131.) 
Here it is noted that, contrary to assertions made in 
testimony at trial (R. 451 at 63-64) , there had been assurances 
that court action would not be taken against Heaton. Heaton said 
in this note, "I appreciate your commitment to keep this on a 
personal basis and out of the courts. I appreciate your promise to 
handle it this way." (Ex. 20-P.) 
On December 31, 1987, Volma Heaton went to Wasatch's office. 
He was there because Elkington told him to give Lynn Hurst a letter 
because Hurst would not release anything without Heaton1s 
authorization. Heaton was nervous and wrote out a letter (Ex. 48-
D) authorizing release of information for 1986 and 1987 and then 
left. (R. 454 at 92.) 
That very day, late in the afternoon, New Year's Eve, 1987, 
Elkington went to Wasatch Steel. This was the first and only time 
that he ever met with Hurst or anyone from Wasatch. He asked to get 
right into the documents showing purchases of steel by Wasatch from 
Steelco, and they were given to him. Mr. Hurst did explain, 
however, that he was upset by all of this and that he had been 
dealing with Heaton in good faith on Heaton's explanation that he 
had an agreement to buy materials from his company. Mr. Hurst 
testified that Elkington confirmed that that was the case and that 
Heaton did have an agreement to purchase the steel but that some 
point he quit paying for it. Elkington also explained to Hurst 
that this was simply a collection proceeding with Heaton and that 
he (Elkington) was simply trying to determine to what extent. He 
said he had no claim against Wasatch. (R. 454 at 93-94.) On 
redirect examination, Elkington denied saying that Heaton had an 
agreement to purchase the steel, but he did not deny the rest of 
this conversation as testified to by Mr. Hurst. (R. 454 at 167.) 
Elkington was given all records that Heaton had authorized. 
He freely examined them. His detailed notes even include the 
notation, as shown on Wasatch's own record, that one of these 
payments was for a "commission." (Ex. 14-P.) Elkington asked if 
there were records for prior years and was told yes but that 
Heaton's letter just authorized 1986 and 1987. Elkington called 
Heaton and asked for authorization to examine records for 1985. He 
then wrote on the bottom of Heaton's written authorization: "In 
telephone conversation @ 4:00 p.m. 12/31/97 Volma consented to 
release of 1985 information." (Ex. 48-D.) Wasatch had recently 
moved to new offices, and the files were not in the best order. It 
was also late in the day on New Year's Eve, but Mr. Hurst went to 
the storeroom, unearthed the 1985 records, and he and Elkington 
reviewed them. (R. 454 at 96.) 
After reviewing the 1985 records, Elkington asked if there 
were earlier records. He was told that Hurst believed there were 
but that he was not sure when Heaton had started sales. Elkington 
asked to look at those records, but the recent move and the 
disorder of the storage room were explained and also that that 
time, on New Year's Eve (it was now after five o'clock), he could 
not produce them and, more importantly, that Heaton had not given 
a release to provide the documents pertaining to the earlier 
transactions with him. There was no refusal to produce anything; 
it was simply a matter of the absence of further release from 
Heaton and the inconvenience of that occasion. (R. 454 at 97.) 
Anything Elkington had asked for had been given to him, and 
anything further he would have asked for, with Heatonfs release, 
would have been given to him. (R. 454 at 98.) 
Mr. Elkington did not say he would come back or get 
authorization from Heaton or anything. He left. He never came 
back. Mr. Hurst never saw him again until after this law suit was 
started in 1989. (R. 454 at 98.) 
In March 1988 Heaton and Alta Industries "dba Steelco" signed 
an elaborate Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 22-P.) The agreement 
recites that Heaton had "engaged in various wrongful and unlawful 
acts, including, without limitation, the unauthorized sale of steel 
products of the company to other persons for his own account" and 
that the company had recently discovered "some of such acts" and 
there had been "sufficient knowledge and evidence to bring a law 
suit or other action" against Heaton. The Settlement Agreement, in 
an exhibit, recited only sales to Allstar and Wasatch. No mention 
is made of other companies to which sales had been made by Heaton. 
The precise dollar volume of sales to Wasatch for 1987, 1986 and 
1985 is recited. The Settlement Agreement has attached as an 
exhibit the very sheets, in Elkington1s handwriting, that he made 
on New Year's Eve at Wasatch listing the amounts for these years. 
For 1983 and 1984 there is simply a question mark after each year 
and no amount is recited, but there is a $5,000 estimate for these 
years. 
The Settlement Agreement required payment by Heaton of 
$32,939.11 cash, plus a forgiveness of debt by Alta "in lieu of 
. . all employment related obligations" of $10,000, for a total 
consideration of $42,939.11. (Ex. B to Ex. 22-P; R. 451 at 141-
142.) Heaton paid $30,329.11 cash. (R. 451 at 142.) The 
agreement also included a Confession of Judgment for $42,939.11 and 
gave a general release to Alta. In return, Heaton received a 
covenant that the company would not "initiate or join in a law suit 
or any other action against Heaton in connection with the wrongful 
and unlawful transactions." No action, civil or criminal, has ever 
been taken against Heaton. 
The complaint was filed over a year later, in April 1989. 
Four months later, on August 16, 1989, after the Settlement 
Agreement surfaced in discovery, Heaton signed a document entitled 
"Rescission of Settlement Agreement" (Exhibit 24-P) attempting to 
rescind the Settlement Agreement on the ground that the schedule of 
wrongs attached to the Settlement Agreement was not true. 
This statement of facts is more extensive than customary in 
order to marshall in the statement evidence arguably in support of 
the decision. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary of Arguments 
In a "Memorandum Decision," the trial court found the 
defendants liable on theories of fraud and conspiracy as well as 
conversion. That decision and the "findings" in it are inadequate 
and contrary to law. The written decision does not mention the 
statute of limitations, nor does it consider the effect of the 
release given to Heaton. The decision begins with a statement that 
"The Court finds by the preponderance of the evidence the following 
facts." (R. 273.) Of course, fraud and conspiracy must be found 
by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiff's counsel attempted to 
correct these errors in the findings he prepared. However, even 
those findings can not overcome the inadequacy of the evidence 
which was contradictory and suspect and is far from "clear and 
convincing." More fundamentally, it remains that the claims were 
released by the prior discharge of Heaton and are further barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
The court also erred in applying the wrong measure of damages, 
in awarding punitive damages, and in awarding attorney fees absent 
a statutory or contractual fee provision. 
I 
The Claims are Barred by a Previous Release 
and by the Statute of Limitations 
Two legal issues are met at the threshold. As a consequence 
of a release granted to Volma Heaton a year before suit was 
started, any claims against the defendants were also released as a 
matter of law. Substantial parts of the claims are also barred by 
the statute of limitations. Thus, the chronology of significant 
events is important. This chronology is shown in Appendix B. 
A. All Claims Were Released By 
the Release Given to Heaton 
More than a year before the complaint was filed the plaintiff 
released Volma Heaton, the principal actor in the alleged joint 
acts of conversion and fraud, without any reservation of rights 
against others. This written agreement released all other alleged 
joint actors by virtue of the Utah Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code 
Ann., § 15-4-4 (1953). For purposes of the Act, an "obligor" 
includes a person liable for tort and an "obligee" includes a 
person having a right based on tort. § 15-4-1. 
Under this statute a release of one joint obligor without 
express reservation of rights against other joint obligors or joint 
tortfeasors releases the others. E.g., Holmstead v. Abbott G. M. 
Diesel, Inc. 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972) overruled on other grounds 
Krukiewicz v. Draper 725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1986); Joraensen v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 P.2d 809, 813 (Utah 1988); Western Steel Co. 
v. Travel Batcher Corp., 663 P.2d 82 (Utah 1983); Sims v. Western 
Steel Co.. 551 F.2d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 1977); Matland v. United 
States, 285 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1961); Greenhalch v. Shell Oil Co., 
78 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1935); Melo v. National Fuse & Powder Co., 
267 F.Supp. 611, 613 (D. Colo. 1967). Although the Settlement 
Agreement (Ex. 22-P) exacted from Heaton a full release, the 
plaintiff gave Heaton only an "agreement not to sue." The 
difference in wording is of no significance. It had the practical 
effect of releasing or discharging Heaton. However denominated, an 
instrument discharging one joint tortfeasor that contains no 
reservation of rights still operates to discharge all joint 
tortfeasors. Holmstead v. Abbott, supra; Sagan v. State, 205 Misc. 
435, 128 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Ct. CI. 1954); United States v. First Sec. 
Bank of Utah, 208 F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir. 1953); Beraeson v. Life 
Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F.Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958). 
It is recognized, of course, that this Court in the Krukiewicz 
case, supra, (725 P.2d at 1350) stated that the 1973 enactment of 
§ 78-27-42 as part of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act effected 
a pro tanto repeal of § 15-4-4. The Uniform Joint Obligations Act 
was enacted by the Utah Legislature in 1953. It has never been 
expressly repealed either in part or in whole. The Krukiewicz 
decision assumed an implied repeal by the Comparative Negligence 
Act, but that decision does not reguire such broad application of 
§ 78-27-42.3 
Repeal by implication 
is not favored 
ftIt is elementary that the repeal or over-riding of an 
existing law by implication is not favored and only occurs if the 
later statute is wholly irreconcilable with the former." Moss v. 
Board of Com'rs of Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961, 964 
(1953); see also. State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1980). 
Implied repeal can be found only when the statutes "cannot, by any 
reasonable interpretation, be reconciled so as to be enforceable as 
a harmonious whole." Salt Lake City v. Towne House Athletic Club, 
18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442, 444 (1967). 
It must be assumed that the legislature "has in mind previous 
statutes relating to the same subject matter" and that, in the 
absence of any express repeal, "the new provision was enacted in 
3The Krukiewicz case, while appropriately addressing the point 
on the limited facts there involved, involved only a narrow factual 
issue of employer liability in a negligence action. That decision 
was directed to the specific issue of whether an employer was to be 
considered as a joint tort-feasor with his employee. The case was 
centered on interpretation of the Comparative Negligence Act and 
application of common law principles pertaining to the employer-
employee relationship. It need not be so broadly read as to hold 
that § 15-4-4 no longer has any applicability. 
accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior 
statutes, and they all should be construed together." Murray City 
v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). Even statutes that are 
"in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed 
to be in harmony with each other." Id. at 1318. "Proper statutory 
construction requires that the statutes be harmonized wherever 
possible, and also that significance be accorded every part of the 
statute." Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d 380, 383 
(1956); Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 757 P.2d 882, 884 
(Utah App. 1988) afffd, 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). "[W]here there 
are two or more statutes dealing with the same subject matter they 
will be construed so as to maintain the integrity of both." State 
v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493 P.2d 604, 606 (1972); Sorensen, 617 
P.2d at 335; see also. Moss, 261 P.2d at 964. 
The Joint Obligations Act 
has not been totally repealed 
Section § 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations Act and § 78-27-42 
which is part of the Liability Reform Act are reconcilable statutes 
that can stand separately. 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Act, adopted in 1973, replaced 
the common law doctrine of contributory negligence with the 
doctrine of comparative negligence. The act retained the concept 
of joint and several liability but also created a new cause of 
action whereby a joint tortfeasor who had paid a plaintiff more 
than the pro rata share of an award could seek contribution. 
The Liability Reform Act was adopted in 1986. While retaining 
the doctrine of comparative negligence, the Reform Act eliminated 
joint and several liability and replaced it with several liability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38. Because tortfeasors in negligence 
actions that accrue after the effective date of the Liability 
Reform Act4 can only be found severally liable, the Joint 
Obligations Act no longer applies to them. The two laws stand 
separately. 
Even under the law as it existed before the effective date of 
the Liability Reform Act, the Joint Obligations Act had some 
application. For example, when a joint obligation arose from the 
defendant's intentional conduct, the Comparative Negligence Act 
generally had no application, and the Joint Obligations Act 
governed. As the Kansas Supreme Court explained: 
4The Liability Reform Act may not be applied to injuries 
occurring prior to its effective date, April 28, 1986. Stephens v. 
Henderson. 741 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1987). One author has 
commented: 
[T]he Liability Reform Act should apply to causes of 
action accruing after April 28, 1986, while causes of 
action accruing prior to this date should be governed by 
the entirety of the Comparative Negligence Act. 
Therefore, if a cause of action accrued prior to the 
Acts1 effective date . . . the defendants involved would 
be entitled to seek contribution from fellow tort-feasors 
after paying more than their pro rata share of the 
plaintiff's damages. If an action accrues after the 
Liability Reform Act's effective date . . . defendants 
involved . . . would be subject to several liability 
exclusively, and thus their need for contribution would 
be nonexistent. 
Note, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable 
Application, 13 J. Contemporary Law 89, 117 (1987). 
In this case, some of the alleged acts of conversion or fraud 
occurred prior to the effective date of the Liability Reform Act; 
others occurred after. However, as discussed below, the 
distinction is immaterial since these are not negligence claims to 
which the Comparative Negligence or Liability Reform Acts apply. 
[0]ur comparative fault statute, K.S.A. 60-258a, has done 
nothing to change the common law rule of joint and 
several liability for defendants in intentional tort 
actions. 
Sieben v. Sieben, 231 Kan. 372# 378, 646 P.2d 1036, 1041 (1982). 
See, Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson. Inc., 586 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1991) (The 
Comparative Negligence Act is "by its express terms, applicable 
only to actions sounding in negligence."); Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 
Ohio St.3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987) (principles of comparative 
negligence have no application to a products liability case based 
upon strict liability); Tulkku v. Mackworth Rees, Div. of Avis 
Indus., Inc., 101 Mich. App. 709, 301 N.W.2d 46 (1980) (comparative 
negligence statute does not apply to strict liability case unless 
contributory negligence would have been a defense). 
Most courts that have considered the issue have declined to 
extend comparative-fault principles to conduct characterized as 
intentional. E.g., Melendres v. Scales, 105 Mich.App. 73, 306 
N.W.2d 399 (1981); Carman v. Heber, 43 Colo.App. 5, 7, 601 P.2d 
646, 648 (1979); Steohan v. Lvnch, 136 Vt. 226, 388 A.2d 376, 379 
(1978); Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis.2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960). 
As a general rule, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act does not apply 
to intentional torts. Comment, § 1, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1991). 
In Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 
1982), on a claim for pollution of wells based on strict liability 
or nuisance per se, this Court declined to require application of 
the Comparative Negligence Act, explaining that: 
Since liability was properly based on strict liability, 
the failure of the trial court to give instructions on 
comparative negligence and proximate cause was not error. 
Contributory negligence is neither a defense to a 
nuisance action, [citation omitted], nor to an action 
based on strict liability. 
The plaintiff in this case alleges two intentional torts: 
conversion and fraud. Contributory negligence is not a defense. 
The Comparative Negligence and Liability Reform Acts have no 
application; rather, the Joint Obligations Act applies.5 
The attempted "rescission11 
is of no effect. 
The Settlement Agreement, made more than a year before this 
suit was started, did not come to light until the deposition of 
Heaton. Plaintiff's counsel was immediately advised that the 
claims against the defendants had thereby been released. Following 
the deposition, four months after this case was filed, in an 
apparent attempt to avoid the impact of the Joint Obligations Act, 
Heaton signed an agreement titled "Rescission of Settlement 
Agreement." 
There are several things wrong with this attempted 
"rescission." First, the claims had long before been released and 
the release served to bar suit at the time suit was filed. 
Plaintiff could not subsequently avoid the impact of that release 
by a "rescission." Secondly, there was no consideration for that 
rescission. Heaton was given nothing. On that occasion, as 
throughout the trial, Heaton was but the puppet of the plaintiff 
doing whatever plaintiff desired. This is in keeping with 
5If the Comparative Negligence or Liability Reform Acts did 
apply/ the matter would have to be remanded to the trial court for 
a determination of the relative fault of the plaintiffs, their 
employee Heaton, and each of the defendants. 
plaintiff's prior "promise to handle" these matters on a "personal 
basis and out of the courts." (See note at bottom of Ex. 20-P.) 
As to the purported basis for the Rescission Agreement, the 
plaintiff asserts in the agreement that "the Schedule attached as 
Exhibit A to this Settlement Agreement was not true, accurate, and 
complete." (Paragraph D of Ex. 29-P.) At trial, Elkington 
testified that the basis for this attempted rescission was that he 
learned that the greatest amount of steel sold to Wasatch had come 
from the shop, that Heaton had received "kickbacks", that Heaton 
had sold material and traded steel for trailer parts to two other 
companies (Davis Supply and Mr. Trailer), and that there were 
"numerous other sales to Wasatch Steel which weren't originally 
listed." (R. 452 at 148.) 
These assertions are contrary to the record. "Schedule A11 to 
the Settlement Agreement (Ex. 22-P) shows no inaccuracy. It was 
taken from Elkingtonfs own audit of Wasatch Steel's records. The 
subexhibits—Ex. A-3 through A-8—are Elkington's handwritten notes 
made when he was at Wasatch. The exhibit itself shows that 
Elkington was aware of sales in 1983 and 1984 by the question marks 
noted for these years and the allocation of $5,000 as an estimate. 
(Ex. 22-P at 8.) The estimate was not far off for an estimate. 
(The actual amounts were $472.39 in 1983 and $8,309.31 in 1984. 
Ex. 27-P.) But, more tellingly, Elkington asked about 1983 and 
1984 when he was at Wasatch on New Year's Eve. He was told the 
documents would be made available at a more convenient time and 
with Heaton's authorization, but he never came back or made further 
inquiry. 
His assertions at trial are equally weak. He claims he 
subsequently learned of sales to other companies in addition to 
Wasatch and Allstar. There is no allocation to other companies. 
There is no evidence of those sales to other companies. 
Elkington claims he was not advised about the commissions or 
"kickbacks,lf as he calls them. Yet his own notes made on New 
Yearfs Eve show a payment to Heaton clearly marked as "commission 
§ 30 x 2848 #." (Attachment A-4 of Ex. 22-P.) He concedes that he 
and Heaton "very well might have talked about" the commissions 
before that Settlement Agreement was ever signed. (R. 453 at 12.) 
Elkingtonfs evasive testimony is not an adequate basis for that 
"rescission." 
He also claimed that he did not know that material from inside 
the plant had been sold. The only other material was the material 
cleaned up from the South Yard in 1986. That clean up was 
completed in December 1986. (R. 452 at 121-122.) All of the 1987 
material had to have come from the plant. The 1985 material for 
the same reason obviously did not come from the South Yard. But 
even more to the point, Elkington asked Heaton in his second 
meeting with him clear back in December 1987 "if he had been 
selling remnant or scrap plate to anybody, and I went through a 
list of companies that I thought might be purchasers of that plate, 
and I mentioned the name of Wasatch Steel, and he said he had sold 
some of the stolen material to Wasatch Steel." (R. 452 at 129.) 
The only place these cuttings came from was inside the plant. 
This contrived effort to sidestep the effect of the prior 
release is contrary to the record, and any finding based on it 
cannot stand. 
The claims were barred when they were filed, and they were not 
resurrected by the subsequent rescission. 
B. The Claims Are Barred in Substantial 
Part by the Statute of Limitations 
The complaint was not filed until April 11, 1989. It alleges, 
and damages were awarded for, acts of defendants dating back to 
1983. Claims for conversion, fraud, and conspiracy are asserted. 
Damages were awarded on the basis of conversion. "In an action 
based on civil conspiracy, the applicable statute of limitations is 
determined by the nature of the action in which the conspiracy is 
alleged." Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d 662, 247 Cal. Rptr. 
304, 310 (1988). See, Cimiiotti v. Paulsen, 230 F.Supp. 39 (N.D. 
Iowa 1964), aff«d, 340 P.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1965.) The alleged 
conspiracy is related to fraud and conversion claims, both of which 
have limitation periods of three years. Thus, this entire case is 
subject to Utah's three-year statute of limitations. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-12-26(2) and (3) (1953). 
An action for conversion accrues "upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the conversion." Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). Each of 
the alleged acts of conversion claimed in this case was complete 
when the steel was sold to Wastach. 
In applying the statute of limitations in a conspiracy case, 
"each continued invasion of the plaintifffs interest causing loss 
and damage is treated as an independent element for limitations 
purposes, and the statute of limitations begins to run when each 
independent element arisesc" Cathey v. First City Bank of Aransas 
Pass, 758 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex.App. 1988). "As a result, a tort 
committed by a conspirator within the statutory period does not 
rejuvenate" earlier acts, and any action on the earlier acts is 
barred* Seaall v. Hurwitz, 114 Wis.2d 471, 339 N.W.2d 333, 339 
(1983)• Similarly, in the context of a continuing civil conspiracy 
to violate antitrust laws: "[E]ach time a plaintiff is injured by 
an act of the defendants a cause of action accrues to him to 
recover the damages caused by that act and . . . as to those 
damages, the statute of limitations runs from the commission of the 
act." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 
321, 338 (1971) . While there is some confusion in the cases in 
considering application of limitation periods to conspiracy claims 
and no Utah case on the point has been found, a meaningful 
application of the statute of limitations requires this approach. 
By application of the three-year statute, any claim based on 
sales prior to August 11, 1986, is barred by the three-year statute 
regardless of whether the claim is based on a claim or conversion 
or fraud or conspiracy. 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision does not mention the 
statute of limitations or the effect of the prior release. (R. 
273-281.) However, in the 63 findings and 17 conclusions prepared 
by plaintiff, the court decided the three-year limitation did not 
apply because Steelco "did not have reason to know and could not 
with reasonable diligence have learned" of its claims. (R. 350-352, 
Findings 46 and 47.) The findings do not explain why plaintiff 
could not have learned of Heaton's action if it had exercised 
reasonable diligence. The court said the "hardship that any 
Statute of Limitations would otherwise impose upon [Steelco] 
outweighs any prejudice [to defendants] from difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time." (R. 351-352, Finding 47.) But it 
does not specify what exceptional circumstances justify this 
"weighing." Alternatively, the court said the limitation was 
tolled by defendants1 alleged conduct in concealing purchases from 
Steelco. (R. 352, Finding 48.) But it does not say what specific 
conduct was an affirmative act of concealment. 
The limitation period runs regardless 
of plaintiff's lack of knowledge 
The general rule is that the statute of limitations begins to 
run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action regardless of whether the plaintiff knows of the 
existence of the cause of action. Bectgn, 668 P.2d at 1257; 
Mauahan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(applying Utah law). Becton recognized limited situations where 
the running of the statute may be delayed until the plaintiff 
discovers or ought reasonably to have discovered the claim (the 
"discovery rule"). As summarized in Maughan: 
Under Utah law, the discovery rule will be applied 
in three categories of cases . . . . First, in several 
areas of the law the discovery rule has been adopted by 
statute. . . . Second, where a party has concealed facts 
or mislead the potential plaintiff, the statute is tolled 
until the plaintiff knows or should know of the relevant 
facts. . . . Finally, "where there are exceptional 
circumstances that would make application of the general 
rule irrational or unjust [the Utah Supreme Court] has 
adopted the discovery rule by judicial action." 
Mauqhan, 758 F.2d at 1384, citing Becton (citations omitted). 
The trial court did not here rely on any statute to toll the 
running of the limitation period, and the first exception does not 
aPPly* B u t further, although subsection (3) of § 78-12-26 (which 
pertains to actions for fraud) specifically provides for 
application of the discovery rule in a fraud action, subsection 
(2), which applies to actions for conversion, provides for 
application of the discovery rule only as to conversion of branded 
livestock. The legislature thereby excluded the application of the 
discovery rule in all other conversion actions. 
There was no concealment 
by defendants 
For the second exception to apply, the concealment must be 
done by the party against whom the claim is asserted. Becton, 668 
P.2d at 1257. There is no evidence of any act of concealment by 
defendants. The only effort at considering the question of 
concealment is in Finding 48 prepared by plaintiff's counsel, but 
even this finding speaks only in conclusory terms of "concealment." 
(R. 352.) It does not indicate anything that either defendant did 
to conceal other than that nothing was said to Steelco. There was 
no evidence of any effort to obscure the facts. Wasatch kept full 
and complete records of every transaction with Heaton. Those 
records were readily made available for Steelcofs examination when 
it made inquiry. Nothing was excluded; nothing was hidden. The 
mere fact that Wasatch did not make inquiry of Steelco as to the 
authority of Steelcofs Superintendent does not toll the running of 
the statute. This would be so even if the defendants were not 
justified in relying on the apparent authority of the 
Superintendent. 
For a statute of limitations to be tolled on grounds of the 
defendants' fraudulent concealment, "there must be an affirmative 
act committed by the defendant and the affirmative act must be 
calculated to obscure the existence of a cause of action." Payne 
v. Stratman, 229 Mont. 377, 380, 747 P.2d 210, 212 (1988). 
The "mere failure by a person to disclose a fact concerning a 
cause of action which arises against him does not suffice to toll 
the statute unless the defendant owed a duty of disclosure." 
Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 376 (Alaska 
1987). "[T]here must be something of an affirmative nature 
designed to prevent, and which does prevent, discovery of the cause 
of action. There must be some actual artifice to prevent knowledge 
of the fact, some affirmative act of concealment, or some 
misrepresentation to exclude suspicion." Unified School District 
No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan.App.2d 346, 629 P.2d 196, 204 
(1981), quoting 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, § 148. "There 
must be positive acts of concealment done to prevent detection. 
There must be some trick or contrivance intended to exclude 
suspicion and prevent inquiry." Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Linsenmever. 100 Ariz. 107, 130, 412 P.2d 47, 63 (1966). 
The plaintiffs failure to discover larcenous acts of its 
employees is not evidence that defendants concealed anything, for 
"[n]ondiscovery and concealment are not the same." Young v. 
Haines. 226 Cal. Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909, 919 (1986). 
This Court has explained that "our cases dealing with 
fraudulent concealment indicate that neither material omissions nor 
fraudulent affirmative statements are actionable absent a duty to 
speak the truth*lf Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P. 2d 
1181, 1186 (Utah 1989) ; see also Sugarhouse Finance Co, v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980); Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 
379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963). Where there is no fiduciary relationship 
which would create a duty of disclosure, a claim may be time-
barred. Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186. The trial court here, in the 
findings prepared by plaintiff's counsel, makes the conclusory 
assertion that defendants had a duty to disclose. There is, 
however, no explanation of what fact gives rise to that duty 
because there is nothing here to have created a duty. 
Plaintiff exercised 
no diligence 
The findings, again in conclusory language and without factual 
foundation, state that plaintiff could not have learned of Heatonfs 
action by the exercise of reasonable diligence. This conclusion is 
an attempt to meet the generally accepted principle that "the 
statute of limitations in a fraud case begins to run when the 
plaintiff by reasonable diligence could have learned of the fraud, 
whether or not he actually learned of it." Coronado Div, Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 350, 678 P.2d 535, 537 (1984). Moreover, 
the "limitation should be tolled for fraudulent concealment only so 
long as the plaintiff is unable, by reasonable diligence, to 
discover the facts necessary for determining the existence of a 
claim for relief." First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N.A. v. 
Piper Aircraft Corp,, 744 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Colo. 1987). 
There is no showing of any diligence on the part of Steelco. 
.On the contrary, Steelco left its Superintendent in a position 
where he could do "almost . . . what he wanted" with the scrap 
material that plaintiff is now suddenly concerned about. (R. 450 
at 184.) Although plaintifffs president is an experienced 
certified public accountant, there were no internal inventory or 
audit controls. The loading and delivery was done in broad 
daylight, during normal business hours, usually while Steelco1s 
second shift was in full swing, always before Wasatch closed at 
5:00 p.m. Even on Saturdays Steelco1 s plant was not vacant—on the 
occasion that finally triggered an investigation, employees and 
even the president were in the plant. It is reasonable to assume 
that Steelco1s employees and supervisors were there on other 
Saturdays. The steel division general manager testified he knew 
that Heaton regularly worked on Saturdays. Drug addicts were using 
drugs regularly—every thirty minutes—on the job. Steelco did not 
give receipts on all cash purchases made by Heaton. Steelco1s own 
trucks made deliveries to Wasatch. Mr. Hurst was over at Steelco 
on numerous occasions. Steelco's Superintendent was even making 
stove parts in Steelco*s plant and delivering them to Allstar 
Manufacturing. Plaintiff made not the slightest inquiry until 
November 1987. 
This is hardly the exercise of "reasonable diligence." Even 
the slightest effort would have enabled Steelco to "discover the 
facts necessary for determining the existence of its claim for 
relief." Piper Aircraft, supra. If Steelco had made any inquiry 
whatever, it would have found the full facts as it easily did when 
it did make an inquiry. 
There are no 
exceptional circumstances 
For the third exception to apply, there must be such 
"exceptional circumstances" as to justify departure from the 
general rule. The finding that the limitation would impose a 
hardship on Steelco and that defendants would not be significantly 
prejudiced in offering proof after the passage of time do not 
amount to "exceptional circumstances." There are here no 
exceptional circumstances. The cases finding exceptional 
circumstances all involved extraordinarily peculiar circumstances. 
See, e.g., Mvers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) (death of 
ward not known until after statutory period); Maughan v. SW 
Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381 at 1384 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying 
Utah law, complexity of scientific data# long latency period of the 
disease). 
Failure to file as soon as a claim is discovered is 
significant. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 
1370, 1373 (Utah 1987); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 
(Utah App. 1990). Heaton was selling steel from November 1983 to 
October 1987. (R. 450 at 12.) Steelco claimed to have learned of 
his thefts in November 1987. (R. 450 at 126, 137; R. 452 at 201.) 
The complaint was not filed until April 1989. 
The claims are 
iustlv time barred 
The discovery rule has no application in this case. Under our 
statute, the discovery rule is not applicable to actions for 
conversion. There was no act of concealment by Wasatch Steel and 
no duty to inquire of Steelco. There are no exceptional 
circumstances to justify suspension of the statute. In the final 
analysis, it was plaintiff's failure to supervise its own 
employees, its own lack of diligence, that is responsible for the 
passage of time, not anything that the defendants did. 
A number of the witnesses commented that the details of their 
acts or conversations occurred "too long ago" to remember 
accurately. (R. 451 at 186, 204 [witness Chris Williams]; R. 451 
at 76, 94, 98, 99 and R. 452 at 7, 18 [witness Volma Heaton]; R. 
452 at 205 and R. 453 at 34 [witness Robert Elkington]; R. 452 at 
24, 35 [witness Patty Midgley]). 
The need for application of the statute of limitations in this 
case is aptly summarized in Becton, 668 P.2d at 1257: 
The policy heretofore adopted by this Court is that 
statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice 
by preventing surprises through the revival of claims 
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." To further that policy, the general rule 
has been that a cause of action accrues upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action. Under that rule, "mere ignorance of the 
existence of a cause of action does not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations." [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
II 
The Findings of Liability Are Not Supported 
by Adequate Evidence in the Record 
The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision that 
findings had been made by a "preponderance of the evidence." (R. 
273.) Fraud and conspiracy must be shown by "clear and convincing 
evidence." Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Pierren, 619 P.2d 
1380, 1381-82 (Utah 1980) (fraud); Crane Co, v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 
870, 872 (Utah 1978) (civil conspiracy). Where a conspiracy theory 
is alleged, the plaintiff has the "burden of presenting clear and 
convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy theory." More v. 
Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 440 (Colo, 1977). 
Obviously recognizing inadequacy in its own written decision, 
the court also stated that its findings were "not all-inclusive" 
and ordered plaintiff's counsel to prepare findings to support the 
decision. (R. 273-274.) The court then adopted in their entirety, 
without the slightest modification, the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared by Steelcofs counsel. In those 
findings an effort was made to correct the error regarding the 
necessary weight of evidence. (R. 335.) 
Although a finding of conversion can be based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, the record does not support that 
finding. 
A. The Trial Court1s Findings 
Must be Reviewed With Care 
In these circumstances, the trial court's findings should be 
reviewed with great care. 
The trial court abdicated 
its responsibility to make 
proper and adequate findings 
Under Rule 52(a) , the court has the duty of making findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. If the findings are inadequate, the 
judgment must be vacated. Anderson v. Utah County Board of County 
Commfrs, 589 P.2d 1214, 1215-16 (Utah 1979). 
Counsel may be invited to submit proposed findings, but these 
are "no more than informal suggestions for the assistance of the 
court." Wright & Miller, supra, § 2578. While this Court has 
deferentially afforded to the trial, courts discretion to adopt 
findings as submitted by the prevailing party, those findings must 
not be clearly contrary to the evidence. The Court has also 
cautioned that it does "not recommend that the trial judge 
•mechanically adopt1 the findings as prepared by the prevailing 
party." Bover Co. v. Liqnell, 567 P.2d 1112-1114 (Utah 1977). 
"The mechanical adoption of a litigantfs findings is an abandonment 
of the duty imposed on trial judges by Rule 52 . . . because 
findings so made fail to reveal the discerning line for decision." 
Kelson v. United States. 503 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1974); 
See, also, Anderson v. Citv of Bessemer City. N.C.. 470 U.S. 564, 
572 (1985); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. . 376 U.S. 651, 
656-57 (1964). The "practice of verbatim adoption of counsels 
findings is now viewed with disfavor." Wright & Miller, supra. 
Notwithstanding these cautionary expressions, the trial court 
made but a perfunctory effort at revealing a "discerning line for 
decision" and did "mechanically adopt" the findings prepared by the 
prevailing party. A litigant, particularly in a matter involving 
serious allegations as in this case, has a right to expect careful 
and detailed attention in a bench trial. The Memorandum Decision 
only emphasizes that that care was lacking here. Even the findings 
of the plaintiff are in large respect but conclusory statements and 
contain very little actual recitation of fact from the record. 
Beyond that, when defense counsel objected to the new findings and 
raised question concerning the court's misperception of the 
applicable evidentiary standard, the court expressed his feeling 
that a judge should "not write a memorandum decision" and that it 
is just a matter of "going the extra mile" to do so. (R. 455 at 1-
3. ) 6 Quite to the contrary, it is the judge's duty under Rule 52 
to do so. The rule requires that "the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon." 
(Emphasis added.) The court said that he had all along intended 
"clear and convincing" but the words of "preponderance" "rolled 
up." (R. 455 at 2.) These statements in the context of broader 
comments endorsing another judge's recommendation that a judge 
should "never" put anything in writing but should "just make your 
rulings and then tell the plaintiff's attorney or the defendant's 
^he court here also demonstrated substantial hostility to 
defense counsel by launching into a speech at the commencement of 
the hearing on objections to the findings before counsel were even 
permitted to speak and by stating "you are trying to hang me with 
that." (R. 455 at 3.) On this same occasion, when counsel tried 
to emphasize the unbelievable nature of the testimony of the 
witness Chris Williams, the court curtly stopped counsel with the 
comment that "Well, I have made my judgment, Mr. Garrett. . . . I 
have made my findings. I don't need you to sit there now and 
comment to me on that." (R. 455 at 13.) Hostility was evident in 
other places in the trial. (R. 450 at 124, R. 451 at 182, R. 454 
at 127-128.) 
lawyer to prepare the findings consistent with the ruling" (R. 455 
at 1) are so out of harmony with the Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the direction of this Court, indeed, so out of harmony with 
concepts of fundamental justice, that they cannot be left without 
correction. 
Error is more readily 
found where findings 
are mechanically adopted 
Although it is acknowledged that past practice has been that 
the mere mechanical adoption of findings prepared by counsel may 
not in itself be sufficient to upset those findings if they are 
otherwise entirely adequate and supported by the evidence, those 
findings will be more meticulously scrutinized than when findings 
are made by the court itself and show the court's careful and 
detailed attention in a bench trial. 
When a trial court adopts a party's proposed findings, the 
findings are examined especially critically when deciding whether 
they are clearly erroneous, and the record as a whole should be 
reviewed with a more critical eye to insure that the trial court 
has adequately performed its judicial function. Andre v. Bendix 
Coro. , 774 F.2d 786, 800 (7th Cir. 1985); Ramev Const. Co. . Inc. v. 
Apache Tribe, 616 F.2d 464, 467 (10th Cir. 1980); Haaans v. Andrus, 
651 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 859 
(1981); Beraer v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 
F.2d 1395, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
B. The Findings of Fraud and Conspiracy 
Are Not Supported By 
Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Although asserted in separate counts of the complaint, the 
claims for fraud and conspiracy are treated with no differentiation 
in the Decision and are but two sides of the same coin. Both 
theories require proof by clear and convincing evidence. The fraud 
count alleges fraud in accepting deliveries of "misappropriated" 
steel. There are two conspiracy counts. One alleges conspiracy 
between defendants and Heaton to misappropriate steel, and it is 
really but the same as the fraud count. Another conspiracy count 
alleges a conspiracy with Chris Williams to issue "bogus" purchase 
orders and to pay kickbacks to Ms. Williams. 
It is not shown that the 
defendants knew of Heaton1s fraud 
The key element to plaintiff1 s case is the assertion that 
defendants knew of Heaton's fraud upon his employer. The 
defendants' only contact with Steelco was through Mr. Hurst. He 
unequivocally denied knowing of Heaton's fraud until the plaintiff 
told him about it. Mr. Hurst testified that Heaton told Hurst he 
bought the steel from his company. (R. 454 at 72.) Hurst knew 
from the start that Heaton was the superintendent at Steelco; he 
trusted Heaton and assumed Heaton was acting with the approval of 
his employer. (R. 454 at 77, 87.) To Hurst, "Heaton represented 
Steelco." (R. 454 at 87.) Hurst was not well acquainted with 
anyone else at Steelco and had the impression that "what [Heaton] 
told me went [with Steelco]." (Id.) 
Defendants were not secretive about dealings with Heaton. 
Heaton sometimes invited Hurst to visit Steelco's plant and showed 
him material for sale. (R. 450 at 66.) These visits gave Hurst no 
reason to question Heaton1s authority. (R. 454 at 79.) Heaton 
showed Hurst some scrap steel in the yard and said he owned it. 
(R. 454 at 83.) At times, the defendants sent their truck, clearly 
marked with the name "Wasatch Steel," to Steelco's yard to pick up 
the steel. (R. 451 at 2-3.) It did not occur to Hurst that Heaton 
might be stealing the materials from Steelco. (R. 450 at 90.) 
The first indication to Mr. Hurst that Heaton was under 
suspicion came in December 1987 when Heaton came into defendants' 
office and said that he was under investigation by his employer and 
Hurst might be contacted by someone from Steelco. (R. 454 at 88.) 
The full extent of this situation was not known until Steelco's 
president, Robert Elkington, called. (R. 454 at 89, 93.) 
Plaintiff's only evidence to the contrary came from the thief 
himself. At trial, under plaintiff's direct examination, Heaton 
claimed that with respect to payments for material delivered from 
the South Yard he told Hurst on a number of occasions, "[Steelco] 
must not know about this." He did not recall Hurst's exact 
response but thought Hurst said something like, "It is no problem. 
I won't say anything." (R. 451 at 7-8.) 
However, in his deposition, Heaton had been asked concerning 
the steel he was selling to Wasatch: 
Q Did you tell [Hurst] that this was Steelco's 
material? 
A When I first started dealing with [Hurst], I 
told him that I was buying it and reselling 
it. 
Q And that is the only conversation you had 
along that line, is it? 
A That is right. 
(R. 451 at 79.) He then affirmed again that the subject was never 
brought up again. He said once when unloading his pickup at 
Wasatch an employee had commented, perhaps in a jocular vein, that 
it "looked like high rate stuff" (inferring it was "hot" or 
stolen). Hurst said, "No, it is not. He bought it," and Heaton 
also denied that it had been improperly acquired. (R. 451 at 80.) 
Heaton conceded that he had "no agreement with Lynn Hurst or 
Wasatch Steel to misappropriate material from [his] employer." (R. 
451 at 132.) 
Thus, as to the scrap cuttings there is no evidence that 
defendants knew or were ever told that Heaton had stolen them. As 
to the material from the South Yard, the only evidence of the 
alleged fraud and conspiracy is the admission of the alleged co-
conspirator, Volma Heaton, made after any alleged conspiracy had 
terminated. Plaintifffs case rests almost entirely on Heaton*s 
allegation that he told Hurst not to say anything. There is no 
evidence of anything that defendants said or did other than to make 
payments as directed by plaintiff's Superintendent and to keep a 
complete and precise record of those payments, the same as they 
recorded every other business transaction. Even Heaton's 
statements are first made after his improper acts came to light. 
A meeting of minds on the course of action is an essential 
element necessary to establish a civil conspiracy. Israel Pagan 
Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1987) cert. 
dismissed. 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). A "meeting of the minds" 
cannot be shown by mere silent knowledge of an unlawful act. More 
v. Johnson. 193 Colo. 489, 568 P.2d 437, 440 (1977). 
For extrajudicial statements of an alleged co-conspirator to 
be admissible, "independent evidence must establish a prima facie 
case of conspiracy, or of the defendant's connection therewith." 
16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 69 (1979 & Supp. 1991); see also, Terrell 
v. Olsen, 378 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1964); North River Ins. Co. v. 
Daniel, 101 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App. 1937). 
To be admissible, the acts or declarations of a co-conspirator 
must also have been done or made while the conspiracy was still in 
existence. They are not admissible when they occurred after 
termination of the conspiracy. Williams v. Great So. Lumber Co., 
277 U.S. 19 (1928); Starmer v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp.. 175 Okl. 
160, 51 P.2d 786 (1935); 16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 69. 
The plaintiff has the "burden of presenting clear and 
convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy theory." Israel 
Pagan, 746 P.2d at 793. "This evidence must do more than merely 
raise a suspicion—it must lead to belief that the conspiracy 
existed." Id. . quoting Dill v. Raderr 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okla. 
1978) (emphasis in original). The evidence is sufficient if it 
shows that "the circumstances are consistent only with the 
existence of a conspiracy"; it is insufficient if it "discloses 
acts just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful 
one*" 746 P.2d at 793. "Disconnected circumstances, any of which, 
or all of which, are just as consistent with a lawful purpose as 
with an unlawful undertaking are insufficient to establish a 
conspiracy." Id., n.9, quoting Dill (emphasis in original). 
Defendants were entitled to 
rely on Heaton's authority 
Defendants' dealings with Steelco were entirely consistent 
with normal business practices. There is nothing unusual or 
improper in Mr. Hurstfs dealing with plaintiff's Superintendent and 
in relying upon the Superintendent's directions. 
"Those who deal with a corporation must deal with agents and 
have a right to rely on the apparent scope of an agent's power." 
2 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 449 
(1990). Superintendent Heaton had actual or apparent authority to 
sell Steelco's "cuttings" to Wasatch. Although Steelco may have an 
action against Heaton if he converted the proceeds, it has no 
action against defendants who reasonably relied on Heatonfs actual 
and apparent authority. 
Actual authority may be expressed or implied. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988). 
Heaton had express authorization to sell or "eliminate" the 
assortment of steel in the South Yard, to buy scrap cuttings for 
his own use, and to sell those cuttings to other employees. (R. 
450 at 126-128, 132-135, 162-163, 191-192; R. 452 at 194.) When he 
bought steel, he fixed the price himself. (R. 451 at 97-99.) As 
Superintendent, he was responsible for maintenance, shipping and 
receiving, and the processing area where steel was fabricated. (R. 
450 at 121; R. 451 at 66; R. 452 at 124.) He supervised the 
shearing, sawing, burning, and forming of various materials that 
generated scrap. (R. 451 at 66.) He was "directly in charge" of 
the scrap pile. (R. 450 at 164.) He had the specific duty to use 
or dispose of the cuttings. (R. 450 at 121-122.) 
The sales to defendants were also a natural incident of 
Heaton's duties as Superintendent. "Implied authority" is "actual 
authority based upon the premise that whenever the performance of 
certain business is confided to an agent, such authority carries 
with it by implication authority to do collateral acts which are 
the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business 
authorized." Zions, 762 P.2d at 1094-95; also see B & R Supply Co. 
v. Brinahurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972). This 
authority may be implied from words and conduct of the parties and 
the facts and circumstances attending the transaction in question. 
Zions at 1094-95. In Frame v. Lanioma Lumber Co., 173 Pa. Super. 
8, 93 A. 2d 891 (1953) the engineer in charge of turnpike 
construction had implied authority to contract for removal of logs. 
Similarly, Superintendent Heaton had implied authority to sell 
cuttings from the processing plant and other scrap from Steelco's 
yard. 
The same evidence that tends to show implied authority may 
also show apparent authority. 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations, § 449 (1990). Apparent authority exists 
"where a person has created such an appearance of things that it 
causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a 
second party has the power to act on behalf of the first person." 
Walker Bank & Trust Co, v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983), 
cert, denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984). 
"It is well settled that when, in the usual course of the 
business of a corporation, an officer or agent has been allowed to 
manage certain of its affairs, authority to represent the 
corporation may be inferred from the manner in which he or she has 
been permitted by the directors to transact its business." 
2 Fletcher § 434. See, Ace Supply, Inc. v. Rocky-Mountain Mach. 
Co.
 f 96 Idaho 183, 525 P.2d 965 (1974). (Conversion action, 
general manager has "at least apparent authority to consummate the 
sale of the tractor"). Herr v. Brakefield, 50 Wash. 2d 593, 314 
P.2d 397 (1957) (Conversion of a herd of cattle, partner managing 
the farm had apparent authority to sell the cattle). 
An agent's authority is to be gathered from all facts and 
circumstances, including the nature and size of the corporation, 
the kind of business engaged in, and whether the transaction at 
issue is an ordinary one. 2 Fletcher § 451. A third party need 
inquire into a corporate agent's apparent authority only in 
extraordinary transactions. Id. See, Zions, 762 P.2d at 1095; 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). 
The sale of cuttings by the superintendent of a steel plant is 
not unusual. Three other companies, by plaintiff's own evidence, 
made purchases from Heaton without suspecting any lack of 
authority. Further, the president of Utah Metal Works Inc. 
testified that there is a custom in the metal industry to allow 
employees to sell materials from a "bone yard." (R. 454 at 51.) 
Hurst knew from the start that Heaton was Superintendent. (R. 
454 at 77.) Heaton occasionally invited Hurst to visit the plant 
and look at material for sale. Hurst spoke to Heaton there, looked 
at materials to purchase from the yard, and received deliveries 
from a plainly-marked Steelco truck. (R. 454 at 77-78.) During 
these visits, Hurst was given no reason to question Heatonfs 
authority. (R. 454 at 79.) Hurst observed that Heaton seemed to 
have "no one over him" (R. 454 at 87) ; his directions were followed 
in making these sales, fixing the prices for them, and loading the 
trucks. When Heaton asked that some of the checks be made in his 
name, he explained that he owned part of the material. (R. 454 at 
72, 86.) None of this seemed extraordinary to the defendants or 
others to whom Heaton sold steel. In fact, Heaton did own part of 
that steel; it was given to him to dispose of, and other parts of 
it he had purchased. (R. 450 at 197; R. 451 at 17.) 
The rule of apparent authority applies whether the agency is 
general or special. Fletcher, § 4886. "Persons dealing with a 
known agent of a corporation have a right to assume, in the absence 
of information to the contrary, that his or her agency is general." 
Id. § 434. The rule also applies where the agent abuses or exceeds 
his authority. Id. § 453.- A corporation is bound by even 
fraudulent acts of its "agents acting in the apparent course of 
their employment, although it did not authorize or know of the 
fraud . . . and although it may have been committed by the . . . 
agent . . . with intent to defraud the corporation." Id. § 4886. 
The agent of a grantor has apparent authority to receive 
payments, even though the agent subsequently converts those 
payments to his own use. Reeves v. Jones. 416 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 
1967)• Similarly, Heaton had apparent authority to sell the steel. 
Even though Heaton later "quit paying for some of the material he 
sold," defendants did not know this and were justified in believing 
he had authority to sell the steel. (R. 454 at 89.) 
$2,300 in commissions does not 
make a $250,000 conspiracy 
The evidence of four commissions requested by Heaton for 
orders he placed on behalf of Steelco is straightforward. (Ex. 28-
P; R. 450 at 77.) These commissions total $2,3 63.44. It is the 
only clear and convincing evidence in this case and that is due to 
testimony and evidence produced by defendants, not plaintiff. 
Heaton had authority to place the order; Steelco needed additional 
ballast steel; and Heaton located some through Wasatch- He asked 
for a commission for arranging the sale and, distasteful as it was, 
the commission was paid. It was accurately recorded in Wasatch's 
records. One of the commissions is even shown in connection with 
payments made to Heaton for purchases of steel and was shown to and 
noted by Mr. Elkington during his New Yearfs Eve examination of the 
records. The others were only shown in the check register, which 
Elkington did not ask to review on that occasion. (Plaintiff 
claims that other transactions not otherwise explained in Wasatch's 
records, totalling $1,728.75, were also "kickbacks." The documents 
do not show what they were for, but even that additional amount 
does not justify the sizeable judgment awarded. Ex. 28-P.) 
Moreover, this "ballast" steel was sold to Steelco below 
Steelcofs cost for the cobble steel which it supplemented. There 
was, therefore, no loss to Steelco. Plaintiff was aware of the 
purchases and, in fact, complained about the quality of some. It 
remains that weight was the main thing; the steel needed no special 
appearance and this steel served the purpose for which it was 
intended. Heaton saw an opportunity while filling a need for his 
employer to at the same time make something extra himself. 
Even though Mr. Hurst explained at trial that in retrospect he 
would not object under similar circumstances to a commission being 
paid to one of his employees who might find needed material at a 
reduced cost, these payments turned out, in the context of this 
case, to be unfortunate. But this entire case cannot rest upon 
whether these payments were ethical. These commissions do not 
elevate the paucity of evidence directed to the conspiracy issue, 
nor convert the purchase of scrap steel, to the status of clear and 
convincing evidence. The case cannot be sustained on this 
unfortunate occurrence. 
The uncorroborated testimony 
of a former drug addict and thief 
is not clear and convincing 
The only other evidence plaintiff has is the testimony of 
Chris Williams, an admitted drug addict and thief who is such an 
accomplished liar that she passed the first lie detector test given 
her. She claims she was paid $6,000 in commissions for arranging 
purchases of the ballast steel. (See Statement of Facts, supra at 
17-18.) There is absolutely no corroborating evidence. There is 
nothing in Wasatch Steel1s records; there is no evidence of bank 
withdrawals or "cash back" from deposits to cover the payments; 
there is not even any corroborating testimony from Heaton. Two 
days before trial, Ms. Williams destroyed what she claims was a 
record of the commissions. 
The transparency of this testimony is most dramatically 
demonstrated by Ms. Williams' explanation made in her pretrial 
deposition that she was paid a total of $4,950 on three specific 
Steelco purchase orders she claims to have arranged. It was shown 
at trial that Heaton was paid $2,252.20 in commissions on these 
very same purchase orders and corresponding invoices. (See, 
Appendix C to this brief.) There is an unquestioned record of the 
payments to Heaton; there is no corroborating evidence for Ms. 
Williams' testimony. As shown in Appendix C, she claims to have 
been paid more than twice what Heaton was paid on these same 
transactions. And more, the total of the two commissions would 
amount to more than half of the total sale price! Having made 
these specific assertions in deposition (at a time when she 
purportedly had a record), there could be no retreating at trial 
even though they amply demonstrate the absurd nature of her 
testimony.7 
If the commissions were paid, why would Wasatch regularly 
record payment of commissions to Heaton but not to Williams? Why 
would Wasatch pay Ms. Williams greater commissions than Heaton? 
Why would it pay commissions of such magnitude that it would lose 
money on the transaction? The testimony of Chris Williams is 
7Counsel's effort to explain to the court the astonishing 
nature of this witness's fabrication was cut short. The trial 
court expressed hostility to counsel and told him to address his 
argument to the Court of Appeals. See footnote 6, p. 46 above. 
unbelievable; it is certainly not clear and convincing. It cannot 
support a damage award for any amount she claims was paid to her, 
and it cannot be credited as evidence of a fraudulent conspiracy. 
The only effort to support this witness's testimony in the 
face of denials by the defendants was Patty Midgley's testimony 
that Lynn Hurst said hello to her and Chris Williams at a movie 
theater. It is not surprising that he would say hello to Ms. 
Midgley because he had seen her when he was at Steelco on several 
occasions. Ms. Midgley said he said hello to both together—not 
only to Chris alone—although on further prodding of plaintiff's 
counsel she tried to make it appear that the greeting was directed 
more to Ms. Williams. This testimony is from an employee who knew 
of the use of drugs at Steelco but said nothing; who knew of 
Heaton's activity but said nothing until after the round of lie 
detector tests, and then only after another employee had named her 
as the source of information. Moreover, her testimony does not 
verify payment of commissions or kickbacks to Chris Williams. - It 
goes only to contradict Mr. Hurst's denial that he ever knew 
Williams. The only other evidence is in this same vein—the 
testimony of Williams and Heaton that on occasion she had 
accompanied Heaton in his pickup when he delivered scrap to 
Wasatch. 
Summary: There is no 
clear and convincing evidence 
When the record is examined, the only clear and convincing 
evidence is that commissions totalling $2,363.44 were paid to Volma 
Heaton for the purchase of ballast steel which he arranged when his 
employer was in need of the steel. It may have been imprudent to 
pay the commissions, but that does not prove a conspiracy or that 
Lynn Hurst knew of Heatonfs fraudulent conduct in selling scrap 
steel. If damages are to be awarded for payment of the 
commissions, that is one thing, but the six figure award of damages 
on other elements of this case are based on the flimsiest of 
evidence, not on clear and convincing evidence. 
C. There Was No Conversion 
While it is recognized that as a general rule even a bona fide 
purchaser for value from one who has no right to sell goods becomes 
a converter when taking possession of such goods, this principle 
implies that the seller of the goods had no authority to sell them 
but rather stole them. Plaintiff concedes some steel was given and 
some was sold to Heaton but contends that the rest was stolen. The 
record is a muddle as to what quantities of steel fit within what 
category. Heaton obtained good title to the steel given and sold 
to him. As to that, there can be no conversion. 
Plaintiff invested 
Heaton with authority 
But most important, defendants relied upon the authority with 
which Heaton acted as Superintendent for his employer. In its 
Decision the court stated that Heaton was "acting without 
authority, apparent or otherwise, of Steelco." But no explanation 
is given. As shown above, Heaton was clothed with authority, and 
Wasatch was justified in relying upon the authority of Steelcofs 
Superintendent—the man in charge of the surplus material being 
sold. Where there is authority to sell goods, the purchaser is not 
a converter. E.g., Lanioma Lumber, 93 A.2d 891; Ace Supply, 525 
P.2d 965; Brakefield, 314 P.2d 397. 
Ill 
The Measure and Calculation 
of Damages Are Wrong 
The errors discussed above were compounded at the trial level 
by application of an improper measure of damages and by an 
erroneous calculation of damages even under that measure. 
The Memorandum Decision declares the "proper measure of 
damages [on the conversion claim] to be the retail value of such 
converted property." (R. 277.) The court agreed that value was 
$104,438 as advocated by plaintiff in Exhibit 30-P. (R. 361.) 
This "value" was arrived at by doubling the amount that Wasatch 
paid for the cuttings. This was assumed to be a retail value based 
on Mr. Hurst's explanation that in deciding how much he was willing 
to pay for steel offered to him he calculated about what he would 
be able to resell the steel for to his retail customer and was 
willing to pay one-half of that estimated amount. The court found 
liability for fraud and conspiracy and that damages were 
$103,967.65. This was arrived at in plaintiff's exhibit by taking 
the amount paid for the cuttings and adding an 80% profit factor 
and also adding the amounts paid to Heaton as commissions and the 
amounts that Williams claims she was paid as "kickbacks." To this 
the court added $100,000 in punitive damages and attorneys' fees. 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 278.) The decision ended with the 
statement that "Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages on any one 
of the theories stated above." In the findings and judgment 
prepared by plaintiff, the award is based on the conversion theory 
because it was the higher measure. (Conclusion of Law 9, R. 362-
363; Finding of Fact 59, R. 357; Exhibit 30-P.) 
In considering any monetary award, ff[t]he fundamental 
principle of damages is to restore the injured party to the 
position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the 
other party." Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co. , 241 P.2d 914, 920 (Utah 
1952) . This fundamental proposition is the standard against which 
this judgment must be measured, whether based on the fraud and 
conspiracy theories or on the conversion theory. 
Retail value 
is not proper 
Inasmuch as the court awarded damages on a conversion theory, 
we first examine the proper measure of damages in a conversion 
case. ,f[T]he measure of damages for conversion when property is not 
returned is the value of the property at the time of conversion, 
plus interest." Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah 96, 102, 269 P. 132, 134 
(1928). Also see, Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 
169 (1971); Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 
1988) . Generally, it is the market value of the converted goods 
which controls. C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, 464 
(1935). Although retail market value has been used where the owner 
is a consumer and would resort to the retail market to replace the 
converted item [Winters v. Charles Anthony Inc. , 586 P. 2d 453 (Utah 
1978)], it must be recognized that "the meaning of fair market 
value varies with the context in which the standard is applied." 
Merchant v. Peterson, 690 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wash.App. 1984). 
Here we do not deal with the retail market• "In determining 
market value, the court must focus on the market to which the 
damaged party would resort in order to replace the subject goods.11 
Goodpasture, Inc. v. M/V Pollux, 688 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 
1982); Restatement fSecond) of Torts § 911 (1979). As summarized 
in the Restatement: 
,f[T]he market that determines the measure of recovery by 
a person whose goods have been taken . . . is that to 
which he would have to resort in order to replace the 
subject matter. . . . [T]he consumer can recover the 
retail price; the retail dealer, the wholesale price. 
The manufacturer, who does not buy in a market, receives 
his selling price. Damages for the profits that the 
wholesale dealer or the retail dealer would normally 
anticipate from a sale are not ordinarily allowed. . . . 
[T]he dealer or manufacturer is entitled to damages for 
any harm done to his business through his inability to 
obtain substitutes and thus satisfy his customers. 
Section 911, Comment a.8 
Thus, a chemical manufacturer was only entitled to recover the 
wholesale price of converted chemicals in Chevron Chem. Co. v. 
Street Indus., Inc.. 534 F.Supp. 801, 803-804 (E.D. Mo. 1982). See 
also, Rosenthal v. Finkelstein, 164 N.Y.S. 41 (1917) (jobber of 
bicycle supplies can recover only price at which he could replace 
converted bells, not the bells1 retail value). 
What possible loss 
can plaintiff claim? 
Determination of damages on a fraud or conversion theory still 
requires an examination of the claimed loss to the plaintiff, and 
8Section 927 contains '• [s]pecific rules on the measure of 
recovery when there has been a conversion or destruction of 
chattels." Section 911, comment a. However, § 911 "defines value 
with particular reference to that Section." Id. 
that requires a determination of the value of the steel which 
plaintiff claims to have lost* 
Throughout the case plaintiff's counsel tried to paint the 
picture that these "cuttings" or "droppings" sold to Wasatch were 
of a dimension that would classify them (according to plaintiff's 
definition) as "remnant" that plaintiff "hopefully" could sell 
again a second time and not mere "scrap" that went into the scrap 
tub. There is, admittedly, confusion in the record as to who was 
saying what when the terms "remnant" and "scrap" were used. To Mr. 
Hurst, these terms were all synonymous, and he did not draw the 
fine distinction between the terms "scrap" and "remnant." (R. 450 
at 40.) As Hurst explained, "The type of steel that Volma sold me 
was considered as new remnant, as scrap, as opposed to something 
that had been used by some other person at some other time. In 
other words, this was material that would have been generated as a 
processing process . . . where cuts were made and that type of 
thing from larger pieces and the remaining type of material would 
be what I bought from Volma." (R. 454 at 67.) Heaton described 
the material he brought to sell on the first occasion as "scrap," 
typically angle iron under 8 feet, plate and shearings" (R. 454 at 
68-69),9 and over the years the structural plates and shearings 
were what Hurst would describe as scrap. (R. 454 at 70.) The 
pieces of plate were "all under 10 feet in length. And in widths 
from five or six inches and less." (R. 454 at 75.) Hurst, having 
listened to Hansen's definition of "scrap" and "remnant," affirmed 
Q o o f n n f n n f o 9 n A f t ^ fi a b o v e . 
that he never purchased anything that was not "scrap" according to 
Hansenfs definition, except for the larger rusty pieces sold as 
part of the South Yard cleanup. (R. 454 at 75-77.) When Heaton 
loaded his pickup to take material to Wasatch, he would tell 
Milzarek or "the girl" (referring to Patty Midgley), "I have got 
some scrap out here." Occasionally they would look over the load 
and estimate the weight. (R. 451 at 93-94.) Even Elkington, who 
prepared plaintiff's damage exhibits, conceded that he really did 
not know what kind of steel Heaton had sold to Wasatch. (R. 452 at 
179.) 
Thus, in spite of the confusion in the record, except for the 
large junk items from the South Yard that were hauled on semi-truck 
to Wasatch, it is clear that the sales to Wasatch were from the 
cuttings in plaintiff's plant. In spite of the herculean effort of 
plaintiff to attribute a higher value by a fine distinction of 
"remnant" as opposed to "scrap," it remains that the steel sold to 
defendants came in small pieces that fit into the back of a pickup 
truck (R. 454 at 75) and was pretty clearly "scrap." 
One thing is certain: Plaintiff would not have to pay retail 
value to replace the steel because plaintiff is in the steel 
businesses and produces "tons and tons" of these "cuttings" or 
"drops" a month from its own processing plant. Moreover, there is 
absolutely no record as to how much of even the "remnant" plaintiff 
was ever able to sell. Plaintiff's only witness on the subject 
(Hansen) could only say that "hopefully" the remnant could be 
resold. On the other hand, the tubs of "scrap" were picked up 
daily by a scrap purchaser. (R. 450 at 151.) (The amount paid, 
depending on which of plaintiff's witnesses is testifying, ranged 
from 10 to 20 per pound or 30 to 50 per pound- R. 451 at 87, 121.) 
And more, Steelco had already been fully paid by its customer not 
only the retail price (which included Steelco1s cost plus a profit 
markup) of the steel that was "cut" or "dropped" and ended up in 
the scrap tub or as remnant, but also for the cutting charge that 
produced the drop in the first place. 
The real value of the material was at most the amount the 
scrap dealer was regularly paying (10 to 50 a pound) to haul it 
away. Wasatch paid even more to Heaton, not knowing what Steelco 
had been getting for it. Wasatch equated the value to itself as 
one-half of what it could resell the piece for in the market 
Wasatch had created. It was Wasatch, not Steelco, that created the 
retail market by being willing to handle these odd pieces, hold 
them in inventory, and accommodate the little purchaser that 
Steelco was unwilling to bother with. 
To take the price paid by Wasatch and double it (as the trial 
court did) is a gross distortion of any damage the plaintiff 
conceivably could have suffered. 
There is no basis for 
award of attorneyfs fees 
The trial court also awarded attorneyfs fees of $35,850.00. 
However, there was no proper basis for an award of attorney's fees 
under a conversion theory. 
Utah follows the "American rule" that each party will bear its 
own attorney's fees in the absence of a statute or enforceable 
contractual provision to the contrary. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). There is no applicable 
statute or contractual fee provision. 
[I]n the absence of any contractual or statutory liability 
therefor, attorneys1 fees and expenses . . . aside from usual court 
costs, are not recoverable as an item of damages in an action for 
the conversion of personal property." 18 Am.Jur.2d § 120 (1985 & 
Supp. 1991). See, Jenkins v. Bailev, 676 P.2d 391, 392 (Utah 
1984); Flvnn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 
356, 361 (1973); Navratil v. Smart, 400 So.2d 268, 273 (La. App. 
1981); Harris v. Cantwell, 614 P.2d 124, 126-27 (Or. App. 1980). 
Punitive dmages 
are not appropriate 
Punitive damages of $100,000.00 were assessed against Wasatch 
and Lynn Hurst personally. The fraud and conspiracy claims cannot 
stand for lack of clear and convincing evidence. There can be no 
conversion where the party making the sale was clothed with 
authority. But even if a conversion claim could otherwise be 
sustained, punitive damages are not justified in a conversion 
action unless the defendants conduct was reckless, wanton or 
malicious. Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1287 
(1973) . "A wrongful act is not in and of itself a sufficient basis 
to award punitive damages." Id. The mere fact that an act was 
intentionally or legally wrongful will not support an award of 
punitive damages. Exxon Corp. v. Bell, 695 A.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. 
App. 1985). If the taking was wrongful but not malicious, punitive 
damages should not be assessed. Fort Smith Iron & Steel Mills v. 
Southern Round Bale Press Co., 139 Ark. 101, 213 S.W. 21 (1919). 
The defendants dealt with a Superintendent whom they reasonably 
thought had authority to make the sales here involved. These sales 
continued in the open for a period of several years. If 
plaintiff1 s Superintendent did not have authority to make the 
sales, it cannot be said that defendants acted maliciously in 
purchasing the steel. 
The award of $100,000 in punitive damages is a very sizeable 
award, being roughly a one-to-one ratio to the compensatory damages 
if interest is included in the computations. Without interest, the 
punitive award substantially exceeds the compensatory award. This 
is based on accepting the correctness of the award as it stands, 
but if properly discounted by application of the statute of 
limitations and other factors outlined above, the award would be 
well beyond the guidelines recently summarized in Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., No. 880034, slip op. (Utah June 28, 1991). 
The amount of actual damages awarded is only one of the 
several factors to be considered in assessing the amount of any 
punitive damage award that might otherwise be justified. 
Crookston, slip op. at 26. Here we deal with a plaintiff that is 
itself a very substantial business entity, and there is no effect 
on the life of the plaintiff. The probability of future recurrence 
is remote at best—the defendants have obviously learned a very 
expensive lesson in dealing with representatives of the plaintiff. 
The circumstances here are such that the plaintiff itself placed 
its Superintendent in a position to create the unfortunate 
circumstances involved. The relative worth of the defendants is to 
be considered. No evidence was submitted as to Lynn Hurst's net 
worth, but he had an income, including bonuses, of about $48,000. 
Wastach Steel is a relatively small business. Its total 
stockholder equity is only $461,087, including stockholder equity 
of $156,290 and retained earnings of $304,797. (Ex. 49-P.) The 
$100,000 in punitive damages is one fourth of this. But when the 
financial statement is analyzed, the punitive award exceeds all of 
Wastach1s liquidity. As shown by Exhibit 49-P, it had only $82,000 
of accounts receivable and cash. For the entire period January 
through August 1990, Wasatch had a net income of only $71,777, and 
this does not count substantial year-end deductions for 
depreciation and other expenses. (R. 454 at 24.) Payment of the 
punitive award and the total judgment will have a severe, adverse 
impact on Wastach1s ability to continue its business. 
This $100,000 award is on the borderline of the ratios 
recommended in Crookston, but in comparing the circumstances in the 
case and the wealth of defendants it is excessive, especially in 
light of prior decisions. E.g., First Security Bank of Utah v. 
J.B.J. Feedvards Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). It would seem as 
important in a bench trial where the judge is the sole determiner 
of the fate of the parties, as in a jury trial where the judge may 
consider the appropriateness of a jury award, that the judge should 
make "a detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds" for 
awarding punitive damages. Here we do not have a detailed and 
reasoned articulation of the grounds for the determination of 
either the liability issue or the damage award. 
In any event, the limitation 
period must be applied 
In any event, regardless of what theory of liability is 
applied, any award must not include amounts for sales that occurred 
prior to April 11, 1986 (three years prior to the date of the 
filing of the complaint) . The total of the sales to Wasatch prior 
to that date is $24,728.88. This is compared to total sales of 
$13,407.55 in the subsequent period ending with the last sale on 
October 16, 1987. Similarly, if commissions to Heaton are to be 
recovered, those commissions paid prior to the three-year 
limitation period must be deducted. 
Summary of damage errors 
While in light of the manifest errors discussed above it would 
appear needless to consider errors in the damage award, a review of 
the damage errors emphasizes the less than careful attention this 
case received. To summarize, it was error to calculate damages on 
a retail basis. What must be considered is the loss to the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff produced "tons and tons" of these cuttings 
each month and most were disposed of as scrap for 10 to 50 per 
pound. Plaintiff did not establish that there was a practical 
distinction between so-called "remnant" and "scrap" in the cuttings 
sold to Wasatch. More importantly, plaintiff offered no evidence 
to establish what proportion of purchases by defendant would have 
been "remnant." Further, plaintiff did not establish what portion 
of its remnant it was able to resell. On the contrary, it was only 
a "hope" that it could sell any. It was, therefore, not entitled 
to recover damages on the basis that it could have resold at a 
retail value all of what it sold to the defendant. It cannot 
charge defendant with having purchased nothing but remnants, and it 
has shown no reasonable allocation. 
Beyond all of this, the calculation of damages failed to 
consider that plaintiff had once sold for full retail value all of 
the cuttings that were sold to defendant. It thereby had recovered 
its cost for this steel, a cutting charge, and profit. Thus, even 
the scrap price that was paid for these cuttings was a windfall. 
Next, while it is conceded that there may be some basis for 
considering the commissions taken by Heaton, even those commissions 
were more than accounted for by the settlement payments made by 
Heaton to his employer. But, there is no basis whatever upon which 
to award damages for the fanciful claims of Ms. Williams. 
Finally, any damage award must be reduced by all sales made 
before the statutory limitation period. 
Summary and Conclusion 
It is unusual to assert in this Court that error was committed 
below at virtually every turn, but that is what we here face. 
Whether that resulted from a too heavily burdened trial court that 
was unable to give the detailed attention that a case of this type 
requires, or whatever, it remains that there is here an exorbitant 
and punitive judgment rendered on the basis of a clearly erroneous 
factual record, misapplication of the law by disregarding the 
release of a joint tortfeasor and the Statute of Limitations, and 
the utilization of an erroneous and miscalculated measure of 
damages. 
The judgment should be reversed and the case should be 
dismissed. 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Code Annotated 
(Statute of Limitations) 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal 
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except 
that in all cases where the subject of the action is a domestic 
animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time 
of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or 
was stolen from the true owner without the owner's fault, the cause 
does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts 
as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of 
the animal by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; 
except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake. 
(Release of Joint Obligations) 
15-4-1. Definitions 
In this chapter, unless otherwise expressly stated, 
"obligation" includes a liability in tort; "obligor" includes a 
person liable for a tort; ""obligee" includes a person having a 
right based on a tort; "several obligors" means obligors severally 
bound for the same performance. 
15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor. 
The amount or value of any consideration received by the 
obligee from one or more of several obligors, or from one or more 
of joint or of joint and several obligors, in whole or in partial 
satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to the extent 
of the amount received on the obligation of all co-obligors to whom 
the obligor or obligors giving the consideration did not stand in 
the relation of a surety. 
15-4-4. Release of co-obligor—Reservation of Rights. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 15-4-3, the obligee1s 
release or discharge of one or more of several obligors, or of one 
or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, shall not 
discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing and as 
part of the same transaction as the release or discharge expressly 
reserves his rights; and in the absence of such a reservation of 
rights shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in 
Section 15-4-5. 
APPENDIX B 
CHRONOLOGY 
November 12, 1983 First sale of steel by Heaton to Wasatch (466 
lbs., $93.20) (Ex. 6-P; Exhibit 27-P) 
Last week of 
November 1987 
December 5, 1987 
(Saturday) 
December , 1987 
December 31, 1987 
March 24, 1988 
April 11, 1989 
May 26, 1989 
August 16, 1989 
Plaintifffs president (Mr. Elkington) is 
advised by other employees of Volma Heatonfs 
conduct. 
Steelco employee advises Elkington that 
Heaton took steel without paying for it to 
Allstar Manufacturing. 
Volma Heaton identifies Wasatch Steel as a 
purchaser. 
Mr. Elkington goes over records of Wasatch 
Steel showing purchases from Heaton for years 
1985, 1986, and 1987; confirms possible sales 
in 1983 and 1984. (Never makes further 
inquiry or comes back to look at earlier 
records.) 
Settlement agreement between plaintiff and 
Heaton (Ex. 22-P). 
Complaint is filed. 
Deposition of Volma Heaton reveals existence 
of release. 
Rescission of Settlement Agreement is signed. 
(Ex. 24-P.) 
APPENDIX C 
Amounts Chris Williams Claims to Have 
Been Paid on Identical Purchase Orders 
on which Volma Heaton Was Paid a Commission 
Steelco's 
Purchase 
Order 
Defendantf s 
Invoice 
Invoiced 
Amount 
Commfn 
Paid to 
Heaton 
(See Ex. 
28-P) 
Alleged 
Comm'n to 
Williams 
(R. 451 
at 191) 
43960 
43859 
44083 
TOTALS: 
154954 
156274 
159448 
$2,497.55 
6,609.60 
4.479.30 
$794.50* $ 900.00 
960.00 2,500.00 
497.70 1.550.00 
$13.586.45 $2.252.20 $4.950.00 
$7.202.20 
(More than 1/2 the sale) 
*22,700 lbs. x .035 (See Ex. 28-P) 
